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I conceptualize a theory of deception within the perspective of discourse and pragmatics 
while choosing to examine the decision to engage in deception within the perspective of 
cognitive psychology. Currently, cognitive perspectives of deception have emphasized 
that inhibitory control of one’s motor processes are vital because in order to respond 
deceptively, one must prevent honest behavior from leaking into one’s actions. Although 
indirect evidence for inhibition is heavily linked with deception, current empirical data 
connecting motoric control with deceptive responses has been difficult to observe. I 
propose a theoretical perspective that shifts the role of inhibitory control in deception 
away from motoric control and into long-term memory knowledge structures. I propose 
that deception requires the inhibition of semantic-memory so as to enable the 
construction of short-term memory representations that contradict semantic-memory. In 
order to examine this question, I constructed sentences that either reflected or violated 
world-knowledge (i.e. true or false sentences) and also manipulated the predictability of 
these sentences. Participants read these sentences and either responded deceptively or 
honestly. The findings suggest that deception suppresses semantic activation that 
normally is triggered automatically. The final experiment validated a novel method to 
study deception and suggested that the specific nature of a goal underlying the deceptive 
behavior is related to this suppression of semantic memory. Future studies are proposed 
to explore if the suppression of semantic memory is generalized across all knowledge-
structure or is specific to the nature of the deceptive goal.  
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Krapohl & Sturm (2002) define deception as “intentionally providing misleading 
information.” The emphasis of this definition is on the act of deploying a deceptive 
response. Due to the forensic/clinical nature of deception research, the lie-response 
portion of deception tends to be emphasized in order to focus on the signal detection 
aspects of deception when it does occur (Spence, et al., 2004; Langleben, 2008). 
However, this approach is not necessarily compatible with a theory driven approach to 
understanding the cognitive processes involved in deception.  For this type of approach, 
conceptualization of deception within the broader perspectives of discourse and 
pragmatics provides a richer theoretical platform from which to frame a testable model.  
In its simplest case (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008) two individuals (i.e. two 
interlocutors) engage in the social exchange of information, but the liar chooses to not 
cooperate with their conversation partner (McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu, 
2014). In the following paragraphs, I describe some of the more influential theories of 
information exchange in conversation, and then describe a theory of deception based on 
the subversion of the conversation rules that are normally implicitly followed during 
honest behavior.  
Information exchange schemas: honesty and deception 
The most influential theory related to the conversational rules governing social 
exchange of information is the one proposed by Paul Grice (1975). He presented 
conversation as being a generally cooperative venture between two or more willing 
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participants. This cooperation principle is governed by several implicit rules, known as 
Gricean Maxims. He denoted four distinct maxims: Quantity (i.e. only say as much as is 
necessary for the listener to understand your point), quality (i.e. only say what you know 
to be true, or at least signal when you are unsure about something), relation (i.e. only say 
what is relevant to the topic of the conversation), and manner (i.e. say things as clearly as 
possible, avoiding intentional obscurity or ambiguity). He summarized these Maxims in 
the principle of cooperation, which states  
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you 
are engaged.”  
 
Gricean maxims are postulated to direct the ebb and flow of the cooperative social 
exchange of information, in which one person requests information and another seeks to 
provide it. The type of information that can be requested/provided is dependent on the 
specific dynamic of the conversation, varying from simple greetings, personal life stories, 
and long-term classroom instruction. Because conversation is dynamic, including two or 
more individuals each seeking their own conversational goals, interlocutors must agree to 
let the speaker/listener roles naturally shift so as to keep the other person invested in the 
conversation (Wilson & Sperber, 1981; Ramos, 1998). Speakers and listeners agree to 
maintain an equilibrium of informational exchange, where both interlocutors are allowed 
the opportunity to pursue their personal conversational goal. Speakers honestly convey 
information relating to their goal and listeners honestly convey information regarding 
their degree of receptiveness to that goal. If both interlocutors believe that the equilibrium 
is being maintained, then both parties will likely deem the conversation sufficiently 
worthwhile instead of choosing to abandon the conversation and do something else. 
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Although the informational exchange equilibrium is described above as being an 
inherent law of conversation, it is important to remember that it only exists so much as 
the interlocutors choose to adapt their behavior in accords to the goals of their 
conversation partner. The decision to behave in accords to these maxims requires an 
explicit decision to cooperate with a conversation partner. McCornack et al (2014) 
recently conceptualized deception as involving an intentional violation of these maxims. 
The usefulness of this theory is that it provides predictable outcomes (e.g. violating the 
maxim of manner would likely elicit a lie of omission whereas violating the maxim of 
quality would elicit a lie of fabrication). The propositions of this theory have already had 
tremendous impact on deception research by stimulating further refinements to deception 
theory (Walczyk, 2014).  
In the spirit of contributing theoretical perspectives to the deception literature, I 
propose a theory of deception based on the decision to cooperate with a conversation 
partner. I agree that conversations involve the adoption of a certain set of conversational 
rules by an interlocutor, and the specifics of these rules direct their behavior throughout 
the conversation. The specific rules that govern one’s manner of information exchange 
will be referred to as an informational exchange schema. Under an honest schema, the 
interlocutor cooperates with their conversational partner, allowing the conversation to 
oscillate back and forth between their goals and their partner’s goals in accords to the 
equilibrium. However, I propose that under a deceptive schema, the liar adopts a set of 
rules that is so radically biased towards their personal goals, that in order to achieve 
them, the liar must intentionally disregard or even sabotage their conversational partner’s 
goals. From this theory, I define deception as “the intentional subversion of the social 
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equilibrium between the information a speaker can potentially share and the information 
that is relevant to the listener’s conversational goals.” Within this context, I define a lie as 
“the behavior intentionally designed by the speaker to subvert the social equilibrium.” 
Thusly, the theory of informational exchange differentiates the decision to deceive from 
the actual deployment of a deceptive response. 
I argue that an information exchange schema contains the following orthogonal 
dimensions: intention to balance shared informational exchange (honesty) vs. intention to 
violate shared informational exchange (deception). Within honesty, speakers behave in 
accordance to Gricean maxims, allowing the listener’s goals to inform the content of their 
messages without any plan to subvert this equilibrium. However, as soon as a context 
involves the decision to monitor for message content which, if encountered, would trigger 
a deceptive schema, both dimensions of the informational exchange schema are brought 
online. Each new solicitation requires the liar to evaluate where the solicitation falls on 
these orthogonal dimensions, which determines the liar’s response. This evaluative 
monitoring is an additive factor even for those occasions if the liar decides to be honest 
(Locker & Pratarelli, 1997). As conversation progresses, liars cooperate only when it is 
advantageous to do so (e.g. admitting truthful content the listener already knows, 
admitting minor transgressions so as to induce trust, and other behaviors that cohere with 
the deceptive-schema’s goals, even if they are not necessarily lies). Therefore, in such a 
conversation, the liar is honest only because the solicitation did not match the deception-
signal, not because they chose to abandon the deceptive-schema. 
The primary contributions of this theory of deception are twofold: 1) The 
intention to deceive is a stage that precedes the decision to elicit an honest/deceptive 
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response and 2) the process of monitoring for the absence/presence of the deceptive-
signal (i.e. the reason for the deception) within the environment directs the decision to 
elicit an honest/deceptive response. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
processes involved in monitoring for a linguistic deceptive-signal and how such a goal 
influences the processes of language comprehension as well as the deployment of 
schema-appropriate behavior in response to the comprehended language. 
Conscious intentionality predominates deception research 
A long held assumption in the field of deception is that conscious intentions are a 
necessary part of the deceptive act (Trovillo, 1939; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004; 
Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011). Under this assumption, honesty is conceived as 
cognitive baseline and deception introduces additional cognitive processes onto this 
baseline. This conception proposes that honesty is the process of generating and 
deploying a prepotent response whereas deception is the decision to inhibit and replace 
this prepotent response. One conclusion used to support the additive demands of 
intentionality is that deception is more effortful than honesty, as reported by early 
deception researchers examining physiological and cognitive measures (Münsterberg, 
1908; Marston, 1920; Burtt, 1921; Goldstein, 1923; Larson, 1923) and modern deception 
researchers using cognitive, physiological, and neuroscientific measures (for reviews, see 
(Johnson Jr, 2014; Vendemia & Nye, in press).  
Initially, deception researchers emphasized the emotional consequences that 
followed from the conscious decision to deceive (Jung, 1910), which came to be referred 
to as the deceptive attitude (Marston, 1917). Goldstein (1923) described the deceptive 
attitude as: “The consciousness of deception appeared as strain, self-consciousness, 
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hesitation, conflict of impulses, emotional disturbances”. In self-reports, the subjective 
struggle associated with the intentional act of deception was linked to moral discomfort 
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996) or fear of consequences (DePaulo, 
et al., 2003). Although emotional sequelae are relevant to deception, I argue that 
cognitive processes are more intimately involved, which is why I have chosen to integrate 
deception and honesty under the information schema that emphasizes cognitive 
mechanisms instead of emotional reactions.  
Deception requires the conscious self-monitoring of one’s behavior, which is 
cognitively taxing and time consuming (Lane & Wegner, 1995) relative to more rapid 
and automatic ways to access knowledge, such as the implicit spreading of activation 
across associated concepts in semantic memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1977). Current theories of deception posit that liars explicitly 
construct a representation of the deceptive-signal (i.e. information that if encountered, 
would elicit a deceptive response), and implicitly activated semantic information is 
judged in accordance to its relation to that signal (Sporer, 2016; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, 
& Mulay, 2014; Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011). Given the explicit self-monitoring 
and inhibitory control involved in deception (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008), 
and that implicit semantic activation is assumed to be an automatic process (Neely, 
1977), deception research has focused on the intentional mental operations conducted on 
activated content, not the processes involved in the initial semantic activation in and of 
itself (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003; Masip, Blandón-Gitlin, de la Riva, 
& Herrero, 2016; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000).  
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The informational exchange theory of deception agrees with prior theories of 
deception that deceptive-schemas require an extensive amount of explicit decisions: 
constructing the deceptive-signal, goal-monitoring to detect the deceptive-signal if 
encountered, the decision to generate a deceptive-response following signal-detection, 
and finally, the decision to deploy the deceptive response. However, unlike prior theories, 
the deceptive-schema is argued to alter the process of evaluating conversational content, 
which means that honest-schemas and deceptive-schemas may involve radically different 
means of processing stimuli and retrieving memorial content.  
In order to examine how memory activation differs across deception and honesty, 
this dissertation will examine how honesty and deception evaluate sentences and generate 
responses to these sentences, while varying the semantic-relation of the information 
within those sentences I will review the deception literature, presenting evidence that 
while honest response time (RT) predictably varies in response to experimental 
manipulations, deceptive RT is more resilient to such effects. I will present a model that 
encapsulates assumptions that are shared across virtually all deception models, referred to 
as the Prepotent-Inhibition Model, and review deception research that conflict with these 
assumptions. I will then propose an alternative model that could account for these 
conflicting findings, referred to as the Binding-Suppression Model. Finally, I will present 
original research that supports the predictions of this model.  
Resilience and stability of deceptive responses 
Resistance to experimental manipulations  
The difficulty involved in deceptive responding is evidenced by longer and more 
variable response times for deception than for honesty (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004; 
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Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005). Although these delayed and variable response 
times suggest that deception is more cognitively demanding, paradoxically, deception 
research has also reliably shown that honest responses are more responsive to 
experimental manipulations than deceptive responses. For example, deceptive responses 
are more resilient than honest responses to long-term practice and familiarity with the 
task (Vendemia, Buzan, & Green, 2005), suggesting that the difficulty of deception is not 
related to inexperience with deceptive responding in an experimental paradigm. Some 
evidence suggests that greater experience with deception only reduces the capacity to 
respond honestly without influencing deception (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 
2011). Deception is also less facilitated than honesty by the amount of amount of 
preparatory time before a response is required (Ito, et al., 2012), an effect that holds even 
when the preparatory cues signal the exact motoric response that should be elicited when 
the response-cue is encountered  (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005; Vendemia, 
Buzan, Green, & Schillaci, 2006). If deception elicited an additive factor on cognitive 
processing, the fundamental rules of limited-capacity resources would suggest that 
cognitive resources should be more easily overwhelmed under a deceptive schema than 
an honest schema (Broadbent, 1977; Posner, 1980; Pashler, 1994).  
On the other side of the spectrum of preparation, deception is less influenced than 
honesty when participants must decide for themselves whether to be deceptive or honest, 
as reported by greater increases in honest RT than deceptive RT, as well as a nullification 
of differences between honesty and deception when participants must intentionally decide 
(Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; Williams, Bott, Patrick, & Lewis, 2013). In a 
prisoner’s dilemma-like paradigm in which participants were instructed to be 
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honest/deceptive to a confederate or allowed to decide for themselves to be 
deceptive/honest, response time was similar across deception and honesty when 
participants decided which schema to adopt (Carrión, Keenan, & Sebanz, 2010). Carrión 
et al (2010) also recorded ERPs as participants performed this task, and reported that 
instructed-deception, chosen-deception, and chosen-honesty all elicited a larger medial-
frontal negativity component (i.e. N450) than instructed-honesty which is a component 
considered to index strategic monitoring of cognitive-conflict (West, Bailey, Tiernan, 
Boonsuk, & Gilbert, 2012). The primary explanation for this finding is that when 
participants are required to decide, the introduction of strategic meta-cognitive decision-
making can artificially increase the difficulty of honesty without extensively altering the 
difficulty of deception because deception inherently requires strategic monitoring 
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005; Williams, Bott, Patrick, & Lewis, 2013).  
The malleability of honest responses and resilience of deceptive responses to 
experimental manipulations is particularly evident in tasks involving rapid stimulus-
response bindings. For example, emotional saliency of stimuli has long been known to 
elicit rapid attentional orientation and alter behavioral response time (Mackay, et al., 
2004). However, emotional saliency of stimuli influences honest response times, but not 
deceptive response times (Ito, et al., 2011). Similarly, experimental manipulations 
designed to interfere with prepared responses tend to increase latency of honest responses 
without increasing deceptive responses, as when interference stems from dual-task 
paradigms (Hu, Evans, Wu, Lee, & Fu, 2013), distractor stimuli (Duran, Dale, & 
McNamara, 2010), or one’s personal beliefs (Johnson, Henkell, Simon, & Zhu, 2008). In 
summary, experimental manipulations reliably influence the speed in which honest-
   
10 
schemas select and deploy responses, but these effects are either greatly reduced or even 
nullified under a deceptive-schema.  
Resilience of deceptive responses to individual differences 
The resiliency of deceptive response times to variations via experimental 
manipulation also appears to extend to research examining individual differences in 
cognitive measures. For example, individual differences in executive function reliably 
explain variance in honest responses but explain minimal variance in deceptive 
responses, as observed with executive-function battery tests which measured inhibition, 
shifting, and spatial memory, (Visu-Petra, Miclea, Buş, & Visu-Petra, 2014), and with 
verbal short-term memory (STM) capacity (Farrow, Hopwood, Parks, Hunter, & Spence, 
2010). Although some variance in deceptive performance has been attributed to 
variability in cognitive function (Morgan, LeSage, & Kosslyn, 2009), many studies only 
examine difference scores between honest and deceptive responses. Without information 
on how honest responses were affected by experimental manipulations, it is difficult to 
draw any conclusions about the relationship between cognitive functions and deception.  
Resilience of deceptive responses to induced cognitive load 
Applied research in the law enforcement field supports the malleability of honest 
responses and resiliency of deceptive responses (Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & 
Meek, 2006). Inducing cognitive load consistently improves differentiation of liars from 
truth-tellers (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Wainer, Gruvaeus, Blair, & Zill, 1974), but this 
must be done carefully so as to only induce cognitive load on liars and not on truth-tellers 
(Verschuere, Meijer, & Vrij, 2016). For example, one reported method to induce 
cognitive load on liars was to require suspects to convey their alibi in reverse-order, 
   
11 
because it was assumed innocent suspects could easily reverse their episodic memories, 
but guilty suspects would need to recreate the alibi from scratch (Vrij, et al., 2008). 
Although the concept initially created much excitement, later research has revealed that 
requiring suspects to report an episodic memory in reverse order mostly causes innocent 
suspects to appear more deceptive (Fenn, McGuire, Langben, & Blandón-Gitlin, 2015).  
Contrarily, deception appears most easily detectable when both the innocent and 
the guilty are motivated to feel relaxed and free to state a large amount of information 
(Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014), especially if the questions are difficult to expect (Vrij & 
Granhag, 2012). However, when the questions are difficult to understand, such as when 
law enforcement investigators include complex exclusionary clauses to simple questions, 
the increase in comprehension difficulty reduces detectability of deception (Podlesny & 
Raskin, 1978). I posit that increasing the cognitive complexity of a task, whether it be the 
comprehensibility of a question or introducing additive factors that obstruct responding 
(e.g. requiring that an alibi be reported in reverse order), the difficulty associated with an 
honest schema is increased to a far greater extent than the difficulty associated with a 
deceptive schema. The reason for this is that deception is already difficult to perform and 
virtually impossible to prepare for unless the liar can practice an explicit stimulus-
response script (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). The actual content of the question or the 
response-modality parameters is not going to differentiate the cognitive-load of a liar 
drastically. Contrarily the effort involved in honest behavior is heavily contingent on the 
parameters of stimulus-response binding (Donders, 1868). Therefore, by increasing the 
difficulty of honesty to a greater extent than the difficulty of deception, the difference in 
cognitive effort between honesty and deception is ameliorated.  
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In summary, honest schemas are governed by the rules of informational exchange, 
meaning that honest responses will vary in accords with the context, such that contexts 
that reduce the complexity involved in stimulus-processing  response-selection will 
facilitate responding whereas more cognitive complex contexts will delay honest 
responding due to the extra cognitive processing required (Sternberg, 1969). Contrarily, 
deception operates on a series of rules that are entirely separate from the standard rules of 
conversation, therefore, the effort required to elicit a deceptive response does not vary in 
a similar manner as an honest response. The informational exchange theory of deception 
argues that honesty and deception are subject to entirely different rules of cognitive 
complexity, which means it should be possible to increase difficulty of honesty without 
altering the difficulty of deception. Both schemas are subject to unique rules that govern 
cognitive processes. Methods to detect deception should consider rules of both schemas.  
Deception and the inhibition of prepotent responses 
One of the primary reasons postulated for the difficulty associated with deception 
involves the inhibition of prepotent responses (Spence, et al., 2001; Vendemia, Buzan, & 
Simon-Dack, 2005; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003). Inhibition is the active prevention 
of one process as a function of another process (MacLeod, 2007). Prepotent responses are 
holistic sequences of events which result from ballistic processes (Osman, Kornblum, & 
Meyer, 1986) that can be automatically deployed without conscious intention or planning 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Friedman & Miyake, 2004), such as the rapid ocular 
orientation to a light (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001) or the recognition of 
common words by skilled reader (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Such automatic 
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responses do not benefit from practice nor are they impaired by cognitive-load or 
autonomic arousal (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).  
Taken together, the inhibition of a prepotent response can be defined as the active 
prevention of a ballistic process which normally reaches its point of no return without 
conscious thought or interference from other processes. Inhibitory control of motor 
activity is reported to be vital component of deception (Hadar, Makris, & Yarrow, 2012; 
Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010; Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Duran, Dale, 
Kello, Street, & Richardson, 2012) and it has a place in virtually every major model of 
deception (Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2006; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & 
Mulay, 2014; Sporer, 2016). As depicted in Figure 1.1, these models propose that liars 
inhibit the honest response in order to generate and deploy a deceptive response. This 
application of inhibitory control is related to the difficulty associated with deception.  
Inhibitory control is a complex construct to measure because it is inherently 
defined by the context of the ballistic process that is currently being inhibited. Examples 
of inhibitory control include: Inhibition of stimulus-response congruity, in which a 
Figure 1.1: Prepotent Inhibition Model. In this model, the critical 
element is the excitation or inhibition of the prepotent response 
following sentence evaluation. 
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stimulus which would normally activate a response must be inhibited in order to deploy 
another response (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Inhibition of distracting/irrelevant 
information, in which participants construct a top-down goal and suppress all stimuli that 
are irrelevant to the goal (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Inhibition of 
prepared responses, in which someone initiates a response, but subsequently decides that 
response is inappropriate and must cancel the response before it is deployed (Osman, 
Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986). Although it seems obvious that deception should involve 
some form of inhibitory control, research endeavors have generally failed to identify any 
link between deception and any specific type of inhibitory control (Caudek, Lorenzino, & 
Liperoti, 2017). In tasks comparing honesty and deception, performance on these 
inhibitory control tasks explain variance that is either solely associated with honesty or 
variance that is shared across both honesty and deception (Debey, Verschuere, & 
Crombez, 2012; Debey, De Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki, & Verschuere, 2015). Even 
when inhibitory control of planned responses was measured via individual differences, 
with stop-signal reaction time, while also experimentally manipulated, with sober vs. 
intoxicated participants, neither stop-signal reaction time nor sobriety explained variance 
unique to deception, (Suchotzki, Crombez, Debey, Van Oorsouw, & Verschuere, 2015). 
If deceptive-schemas inhibit prepotent responses, then deception research should 
explore the effects of such inhibition on the responsiveness of prepotent responses. 
Different prepotent responses (e.g. pupillary dilation, galvanic skin response, heart rate, 
etc.) differ in their response to deceptive schemas (Verschuere, Kindt, Meijer, & Ben‐
Shakhar, 2016). For example, physiological evidence suggests that deceptive schemas 
suppress all prepotent motor responses, not just those associated with honesty 
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(Pennebaker & Chew, 1986). When a mechanism is inhibited, it becomes less responsive 
to stimuli which would normally activate it (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001).  If 
deception inhibits mechanisms that are normally involved in behavioral responding, then 
perhaps their suppression is related to the cognitive demands of deception. Imagine 
hanging a picture on the wall while refusing to use a hammer. It is still possible, but 
lacking such an appropriate tool increases the difficulty. Similarly, if deceptive-schemas 
suppress a wide range of cognitive mechanisms that are available under an honest-
schema, then those mechanisms will be less responsive to stimuli under deceptive-
schemas. Deception’s reliance on slower cognitive operations relative to honesty results 
in the paradoxical finding that deceptive responses are: 1) Longer and more variable than 
honest responses and b) more stable across experimental contexts than honest responses.  
Deception and the inhibition of semantic memory  
Liars actively inhibit implicit semantic associations from directing response 
generation in order to construct responses that may not cohere with semantic and episodic 
memory (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Meek, Phillips, 
Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013). By suppressing the role of semantic activation on 
response-generation, liars must rely on conscious evaluative processes to generate 
responses that contradict semantic memory and sufficiently accomplish their 
conversational goals (Frith & Frith, 2008). From this perspective, honesty and deception 
might differ in processing time because honesty involves cognitive resources that operate 
on a faster timescale than the cognitive resources involved during deception, such as the 
decision to allow exogenous cues to direct attentional search as opposed to constantly 
requiring goal-based vetting of generated-responses (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012).  
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The conscious decision to deploy a response that directly contradicts semantic 
memory may underlie the subjective conflict as well as the processing costs associated 
with deception. Constant self-regulation rapidly depletes cognitive resources (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000) and can be detrimental to one’s emotional and physical health (Lane & 
Wegner, 1995). Such subjective conflict will not be resolved via verbal working memory 
capacity or inhibitory control. Perhaps the resiliency of deception to experimental 
manipulation is due to the proactive inhibition of implicit processes. If implicit processes 
are no longer allowed to direct responding under a deceptive schema, then not only will 
deceptive responses become inherently delayed, but also, any effects that would elicit 
differential degrees of implicit responding will become nullified due to the utter lack of 
involvement from implicit processes.  
The concept that deception inhibits semantic memory from informing motor 
responses is not unfounded in the literature (Gardner, 1937; Runkel, 1936; Morgan & 
Ojemann, 1942; Münsterberg, 1908). Luria (1932) likened deception to the destruction of 
organized behavior, whereby the liar prevents automatic associations from informing 
motor output and then selectively replaces undesirable honest responses with deceptive 
ones. The conscious awareness and suppression of unexpressed responses has been 
argued to delay behavioral responding relative to when stimulus-response programs are 
informed by rapid semantic associations (Morgan & Ojemann, 1942; Vrij, 1997). When 
Farrow et al. (2010) observed that verbal working memory only benefited honest 
responses, they argued that honest responses benefited from rapid memory retrieval 
because each memory-trace did not require conscious evaluation if semantic associations 
were sufficiently strong but every deceptive response required conscious evaluation 
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regardless of memory-trace strength. In fact, this effect was so profound that high verbal 
working memory increased the detectability of deception because as verbal working 
memory increased, honest responses became faster and deceptive responses remained the 
same, resulting in larger differences between honest and deceptive responses. The 
inaccessibility of implicit associations to inform deception delayed responses until such 
time as conscious evaluative processes can determine the appropriateness of a response. 
Therefore, deception detection was facilitated by speeding honest responses instead of 
influencing deceptive responses.  
The field of psychophysiological detection of deception also supports the reduced 
accessibility to memory-traces when under a deceptive schema. For example, the P3b 
ERP waveform, itself a neural signature of memory updating (Polich, 2007), is 
suppressed in deception relative to honesty (Vendemia, Buzan, Green, & Schillaci, 2006; 
Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009; Stelmack, Houlihan, & Doucent, 
1994; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; 2004; Johnson, Henkell, Simon, & Zhu, 2008). 
Most intriguingly, when a memory-trace contains misinformation, and thus is relatively 
less cogent, honest-schemas elicit a suppressed P3b whereas deceptive-schemas 
consistently suppress P3b regardless of memory cogency (Meek, Phillips, Boswell, & 
Vendemia, 2013). Further evidence that deception alters memory activation is that under 
honest-schemas, stimuli that are similar to remembered items, but do not match (e.g. 
when two playing cards share a number, but differ in suit) elicit larger P3b amplitudes 
than stimuli that are very different from remembered items (e.g. when one playing card is 
a number and the other is a face card), whereas under deceptive-schemas, all mismatch 
stimuli elicit similar P3b components regardless of similarity to the remembered item 
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(Marchand, Inglis-Assaff, & Lefebvre, 2013). It appears that the potential for activation 
gradients within semantic memory, which have long been reported to be an automatic 
component of semantic memory (Neely, 1977; Heyman, Hutchison, & Storms, 2016), 
may be proactively suppressed following the activation of a deceptive-schema. 
Further ERP deception research has examined the N400, a component associated 
with automatic memory retrieval processes (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011). The examination of this component in deception has revealed that the 
N400 is enhanced (i.e. more negative going) in deception relative to honesty, suggesting 
that deception restricts access to memory (Meek, Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013; 
Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009; Stelmack, Houlihan, & Doucent, 
1994; Tu, et al., 2009; Proverbio, Vanutelli, & Adorni, 2013). Although the N400-effect 
has been reported when comparing deceptive responses to semantically-relevant vs. 
semantically-irrelevant information (Ganis & Schendan, 2013), few studies have 
counterbalanced semantic-relation and information schema. The majority of N400 studies 
on information schema have examined the relationship between schema and either 
sentence truth-value or stimulus-response congruity following a response-cue (Meek, 
Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013). There has been minimal work comparing 
deception and honesty during the process of sentence evaluation and then examining the 
N400 on words varying in semantic-relation to the constructed context. One goal of the 
present research is to provide the deception literature with the materials to examine 
sentence evaluation during honesty and deception in such a way that sentence-evaluation 
is orthogonal to sentence truth-value and stimulus-response conflict. 
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Deception: inhibition of motor responses or semantic memory? 
Individuals who are prepared to deceive activate a response inhibition process 
prior to the evaluation of incoming information, even if they eventually opt to be honest. 
In order to respond honestly, this inhibitory process must be decoupled, which incurs a 
cognitive-cost for the otherwise honest response. Figure 1.2 shows that responding 
honestly with a different response than the prepared one required similar time as either 
deceptive response, but deceptive responses were relatively similar regardless of response 
interference (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005).  
By choosing to monitor for a deceptive-signal which, liars may activate inhibition 
in a proactive manner, in order ensure all incoming information is evaluated. Even if 
someone chooses to respond honestly, the time it takes to decouple the inhibitory process 
may nullify any memorial benefits of implicit semantic activation (see Figure 1.2) 
Prior research has proposed that the role of response inhibition is additive to the honest 
prepotent response. In such a model, referred to as the Prepotent Inhibition Model (see 
Figure 1.2: Congruent and Incongruent RTs when participants 
were not cued until Stimulus 2.  Adapted with permission from 
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005) 
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Figure 1.1), semantic associations are similarly accessible under honesty and deception, 
but deception engages inhibitory control predominantly on motoric processes. Semantic 
associations transcend spatial and temporal boundaries, allowing for distinct memory 
episodes to be consolidated together if their features are sufficiently similar (Tse, et al., 
2007; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Tulving, 1972). This consolidation enables past 
experiences to implicitly inform current behavior without explicit memory retrieval of 
individual episodic events. Although survival is often facilitated by generalizing prior 
experiences to the current environment (Seligman, 1970), deception usually requires a 
response that will not generalize outside the immediate context because it contains 
information that is simply not true.  
I propose that inhibitory control operates within semantic associations, such that 
the automatic spreading of activation between associated concepts in semantic memory is 
suppressed, hereafter referred to as the Binding-Suppression Model (see Figure 1.3). The 
Binding-Suppression Model proposes that in order to engage in a deceptive act, one must 
choose to suppress semantically-associated concepts as those associations are based in 
one’s understanding of world-knowledge, and deception requires the liar to generate 
information that overtly contradicts that knowledge. Under a deceptive schema, the truth 
interferes with implicit spreading of activation across semantic memory is suppressed, 
which enables the liar to consciously integrate information that would otherwise elicit 
interference from semantic-memory.  
If deception inhibits semantic memory, much about the literature becomes clear. 
Deceptive responses are less subject to experimental manipulations or individual 
differences than honesty because those experimental variables are more relevant to 
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automatic semantic associations than conscious evaluations. If deception inhibits those 
associations, then variation in semantic associations will predict variation in honest 
responses, but not in deceptive responses. This also explains why deceptive responses 
have a much higher “floor” of response latency than honesty. Honest responses can be 
rapidly deployed if sufficient information is rapidly attained, but this does not apply for 
deceptive responses. Without the involvement of rapid semantic associations, deceptive 
responses must be generated via slower systems accessible to conscious evaluation.  
When deception is viewed from the cognitive perspective provided by the 
Binding-Suppression Model, the historical research emphasizing the emotional 
consequences of the deceptive attitude deserve to be reinterpreted. In his initial work on 
reaction time of deceptive responses, Marston (1920) describes a state of deception-
specific response delays as follows: 
Figure 1.3: Binding-Suppression Model. In this model, the critical 
element is the involvement or suppression of implicit semantic 
associations. If these are suppressed by deception or impoverished 
stimuli, then conscious memory search and retrieval is required in 
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The witness, unable to concentrate because of the inevitable physiological 
expressions of his fear, becomes more and more introspectively aware of the fear content 
itself, and proceeds to exert great effort to suppress this fear….such increased effort only 
tends to bring intellectual and motor processes into consciousness in addition to the fear 
content already present. – pg 79 
 
Marston’s argument is that a liar’s awareness of potential consequences elicits emotional 
reactions which prevent the generation of thoughts unrelated to the emotion, which then 
only increase the emotional consequences which only further prevents the generation of 
other thoughts. When the cognitive framework underlying binding-suppression is 
considered, Marston’s observation can be reinterpreted without changing his observation. 
My interpretation is that the decision to activate a deceptive schema triggers 
binding-suppression, which suspends the implicit generation of novel thoughts. Although 
an emotional experience can be elicited via awareness of potential consequences, the 
emotional experience itself does not impair one’s ability to generate novel thoughts. 
Instead, I propose that binding-suppression is always active when one decides to lie, 
regardless of the emotional consequences. I do agree that under situations that elicit 
potential consequences, the introspective awareness of binding-suppression, as described 
by Marston (1920), can propel the intensity of these emotional experiences. But these two 
concepts, binding-suppression and the deceptive attitude, are distinct components 
underlying the deceptive-schema.  
Deception and the complexity of response-selection 
As the literature currently exists, the only consistent experimental manipulation 
that alters latencies of deceptive responses is the complexity involved in selecting and 
deploying an appropriate response. Psychological research has long observed that as 
number of viable responses increases, time required to select and deploy a particular 
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response also increases (Donders, 1868), and this finding appears to extend to the 
complexity involved in determining a deceptive response. For example, lying about a fact 
is easier than lying about a held belief, as measured by response latency (Ofen, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, Chai, Schwarzlose, & Gabrieli, 2017) and speech-errors (Vru & Heaven, 1999). 
Similarly, open-ended questions (e.g. describe what happened) induce deception specific 
difficulty relative to simple yes/no questions (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 
2003) and are effective in differentiating deceptive responses from honest responses 
(Oxburgh, Myklebust, & Grant, 2010), presumably because open-ended questions 
provide liars less explicit direction in generating responses.  
The hypothesis that deception becomes more difficult as number of available 
responses are increased has been quantitatively examined in Williams, Bott, Patrick, & 
Lewis (2013). These researchers presented participants with either two-choice 
alternatives or three-choice alternatives meaning that, liars presented with two-choice 
alternatives merely had to select the single incorrect response whereas liars presented 
with three-choice alternatives had to determine which of the two incorrect responses 
should be selected. Contrarily, honest responding only changed in the degree of visual 
search needed to locate the honest response choice, so the difference in difficulty across 
honesty and deception was unique to deception. This increase in response alternatives 
increased latency of deceptive responses without influencing honest responses. These 
researchers also found that preemptively invalidating one of the response alternatives in 
three-choice alternatives reduced the deception specific difficulty. On the other side of 
this spectrum, the sole exception to the finding of delayed responding in deception is that 
deceptive responses can be speeded if an explicit stimulus-response script can be learned 
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and practiced (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), providing further proof that response-complexity 
is a primary source of deception-related response variability. These findings bolster the 
argument that the process of constructing and selecting the lie response is an additive 
factor unique to the deception. The process of examining deception and honesty should 
consider the fact that there is greater response-ambiguity in deception relative to honesty. 
Summary of literature review of deception research 
I hypothesized that deception involves an inhibitory mechanism which is active at 
the semantic level, such that semantic associations which implicitly generalize across 
concepts are suppressed, requiring the liar to rely on slower conscious evaluations that do 
not vary as a result of stimulus-based features (e.g. semantic-relatedness). I conducted 
three experiments to test the Binding-Suppression Model by manipulating the 
accessibility of semantic memory traces during response generation.  If deception inhibits 
prepotent responses by suppressing bindings between easily accessible memory traces 
and stimulus-response bindings, then the degree of truth prepotency should not influence 
deceptive RT, but truth prepotency should influence honest RT.  
Psycholinguistic manipulations and the accessibility of semantic memory 
Although honest responses are assumed to be prepotent, that doesn’t necessarily 
mean that honest responses are simple to generate and deploy. In order to respond 
honestly, participants understand task-rules, process environmental stimuli, determine the 
appropriate response, and then deploy the response. Effects in each of these processing 
stages will sum into response, which can easily lead to erroneous conclusions about a 
mental process (Sternberg, 1969). For example, the Wason Selection Task, in which 
participants must comprehend rules and then generate potential hypotheses to test them, 
has long been used to study executive-function and higher order reasoning (Wason, 1968; 
   
25 
Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995). However, modern evidence suggests that many of these 
reported effects reflect simpler issues related to text processing instead of higher order 
reasoning (Almor & Sloman, 2000). Psychological research requires extensive 
experimental control in order to isolate an intended psychological construct (Osgood, 
1953), so the notion that honesty is a simple process should not be taken for granted 
One factor that is necessary for honesty and deception is sentence-evaluation 
because comprehending someone’s intended message is vital for conversation. In this 
dissertation, sentence-evaluation involves comparing the meaning of a sentence against 
world knowledge (i.e. is it true or false). Psycholinguistic evidence reveals that 
determining truth-value is complex (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975; 
Wason, 1959; Singer, 2013) but there are certain patterns in terms of how the 
relationships between words influence the complexity of sentence-evaluation (Collins & 
Quillian, 1969; Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 
1994). Below, I define and describe some of the relations relevant for this dissertation.  
Lexical information, word-based linguistic information, constrains the 
relationships between words within a sentence (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 
1994). Lexical relationships are generally divided into two forms of information: 
semantic and syntactic. Semantic relationships are defined as those that exist between the 
meanings of words within the sentence whereas syntactic relationships are defined as the 
functional relationships between words within the sentence. Semantic relationships are 
generally accessed automatically, even under states of high cognitive load whereas 
syntactic relationships require more effortful processing and are less accessible under 
states of high cognitive load (Friederici, Rueschemeyer, Hahne, & Fiebach, 2003).  
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During sentence-evaluation, semantic-memory activates knowledge structures, 
and sentence-evaluation enables people to determine the degree to which that sentence is 
true by comparing it to what is known about the world. Overall, world-knowledge refers 
to information that is heavily entrenched, which means that certain beliefs are contingent 
on world-knowledge being accurate (Shipley, 1993). The more entrenched a concept is 
within knowledge structure, the more easily it is comprehended and the more resistant it 
is to change or even damage (Langacker, 1987). Therefore, sentences that are true are 
evaluated as such because they cohere with deeply entrenched concepts within LTM to a 
greater degree than false sentences. Therefore, over the course of their lifetime, 
participants have had a greater frequency of exposure to true concepts than false 
concepts. Through the process of sentence-evaluation, people compare the sentence to 
world, and mismatches elicit a false evaluation (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 
2004). 
The process of integrating words into a holistic unit is incremental, whereby each 
word adjusts the meaning that the sentence could convey (Morris, 1994; Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999; Matsuki, et al., 2011; Isberner & Richter, 2013). By incrementally 
integrating linguistic input into a holistic unit, information that is incongruent with the 
context is rapidly suppressed, enabling one to integrate only relevant information into the 
preceding context (Fischler & Bloom, 1979; Stanovich & West, 1979; Swinney, 1979; 
Neely, 1977). This suppression process is informed by how constraining the context is 
with respect to what is congruent.  As the probability of an individual word in a context 
(i.e. cloze-probability) becomes increasingly high, the effort required to comprehend and 
integrate that word into the sentence is reduced (Payne & Federmeier, 2017). 
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Relevance of psycholinguistic research to deception research 
Liars must comprehend the meaning of stimuli which prompt deceptive responses 
(e.g. questions) and subsequently generate a lie that is uniquely appropriate for that 
particular stimulus. Because language comprehension is often a necessary preceding 
component of deception generation, I posit that deception research can be conducted with 
greater precision if linguistic features of stimuli are experimentally manipulated. 
Deception and honesty may elicit distinct processing patterns during evaluation of 
sentence truth-value, and if so, uncontrolled variation in sentence complexity may 
obscure, or even alter, effects related to deception or honesty. Manipulating the lexical 
relationships relevant to sentence evaluation will enable me to observe deception and 
honesty across different linguistic environments. If certain lexical manipulations 
influence honesty, but not deception (or vice-versa), the distinct cognitive processes that 
underlie deception and honesty will be better understood. I argue that the findings from 
psycholinguistic literature can inform the use of linguistic stimuli in experimental designs 
for deception research by manipulating the degree of involvement required by automatic 
and controlled processes.  
The goal of this series of studies is to examine the role of lexical information in 
the process of deploying deceptive vs. honest responses. In the present studies, I 
manipulated the semantic and syntactic relationships within sentences and examined how 
deception/honesty differed in truth-value evaluation as well as subsequent responses to 
prompts. By altering statement comprehensibility, I examined the relationship between 
the operations which underlie deception and those which underlie semantic memory. 
Upon examining the role of lexical relationships in deception and honesty, I examined 
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how sentence content and intent-to-deceive interacted when participants needed to 
simultaneously determine truth-value and whether or not it was appropriate to be 
deceptive or honest. 
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Plausibility Item Development 
I conducted a series of item-development studies to construct items that balanced 
sentence truth-value with the content of the sentence itself. 
 Methods 
Participants  
Participants were 16 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina, 
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials 
Items that varied in plausibility were developed to develop a set of items that 
would allow me to test if the lexical relationships within a sentence are relevant to the 
process of sentence evaluation across different information schemas. These items 
consisted of three sentences each, with one true sentence that would contain semantically 
related words (true sentences), and two false sentences. One false sentence would contain 
semantically related words (implausible sentence), and the other would contain 
semantically unrelated words (violation sentences). All sentences were designed to be 
grammatically correct and interpretable. These items would allow me to test if 
information schema altered the process of evaluating truth-value, as would be observed 
by deceptive and honest schemas eliciting different patterns of responding to the false 
sentences.  The Prepotent Inhibition Model predicted that the implausible sentences will 
 DESIGNING TEST ITEMS 
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benefit from semantic relationships whereas the Binding-Suppression Model predicts that 
such semantic facilitation would be suppressed under a deceptive schema.  
I adapted sentences from prior research on truth evaluation (Nieuwland, 2015) in 
order to create three types of sentences: true, implausible, and violation as shown in 
Table 2.1.  True sentences (1) referred to semantically-related information in a manner 
consistent with world knowledge. Implausible sentences (2) referred to semantically-
related information in a manner inconsistent with world knowledge. Violation sentences 
(3) referred to semantically-unrelated information.  
Pre-critical region Object Post-critical region 
Subject Verb True Implausible Violation 
 
Teachers punish students principals nurses that are disrupting the class 
Cowboys ride horses buffalo camels when they go to the ranch 
Lifeguards protect swimmers sharks birds at the beach 
Hunters shoot deer cattle insects during the hunting season 
Gardeners plant flowers weeds sand to make their garden prettier 
Weathermen report storms asteroids murders that are expected in the next few days 
Barbers cut hair wigs steak while carrying on a conversation 
Plumbers remove clogs weeds lamps using special equipment 
Architects design buildings tunnels1 sandcastles with a lot of windows 
Cleaners wash clothes paper trees1 using detergent 
Supervisors scold workers senators pets1 who show up late 
Authors write books laws schedules1 to make a living 
Witnesses describe suspects bystanders1 buildings1 as causing the crime 
Attorneys meet clients prisoners2 hermits at their law firm 
Journalists report news nothing1 recipes to inform the public about important issues 
1 Sentences in evaluation of the Post-Critical-Region was required to assess truth-value. 
2 Post-experiment analysis suggested the sentence’s truth-value was ambiguous 
 
As depicted in Table 2.1, the sentences contained a pre-critical region containing 
a plausible noun-verb combination, the critical region containing the truthful, 
Table 2.1: Stimuli developed based on plausibility. The pre and post-critical region are 
constant, but the object-noun in the critical region was manipulated 
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contradictory or implausible information, followed by a post-critical region which 
contained contextual information consistent with both pre-critical and critical region 
information.  A total of 15 items were created, totaling 45 sentences, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. Participants were divided into two groups. All participants encountered the 
true sentences, but half of the participants encountered the contradictory sentences and 
the other half encountered the implausible sentences. Each sentence was repeated 6 times 
throughout the experiment, resulting in a total of 240 trials.  
Procedure 
The procedure will be addressed in more detail in the current research section, but 
see Figure 2.2 for a visual depiction. Participants arrived in the lab and practiced a pen-
and-paper version of the task before practicing the task on the computer. In order to 
proceed to the experiment, each participant had to achieve at least 67% accuracy. For 
each trial, participants were presented with a sentence that they evaluated as true or false. 
When they were ready to continue, they pressed the spacebar and viewed a fixation point 
Figure 2.1: Experimental Design to develop plausibility items. Honesty and 
deception are cued by font-color, with the second prompt containing either the word 
True or False. Each sentence was repeated 6 times throughout the experiment, cued 
for honesty and deception 3 times each. 
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for 500 ms (plausibility item development) or 750-1250 ms (all other studies). They were 
then presented with a second-prompt, the word True or False. The information schema 
for the trial was cued by font color (all studies except Embedded-Cue) or sentence-
content (Embedded-Cue), and participants were instructed to respond in accordance to 
the information schema by pressing a key to indicate agreement or disagreement with the 
prompt-word.  
H1: I expected to replicate previous research showing that honest responses are 
faster and more accurate than deceptive responses.  
H2: I expected to replicate previous research showing that honest responses are 
faster and more accurate when responding to true sentences than to false sentences. 
H3: I predicted that deceptive responses would be faster and more accurate when 
responding to anomalous sentences than to implausible and violation sentences.  
Figure 2.2: Directed Deception Task using a Standard Sentence Verification 
Task.  A sentence is presented on a screen for 2500-3000ms, followed by a 
fixation prompt, and then the word “True” or “False”.  Participants are cued by 
font-color to respond honestly or deceptively, and they do so by indicating their 
agreement or disagreement with the second prompt. 
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Results 
One participant was removed from the study after data collection, when the post 
session interview revealed that English was the participant’s second language, leaving 16 
participants for data analysis.  I conducted two paired t-tests on RT and error data, 
comparing honest and deceptive responses. Participants responded significantly faster 
[t(15) = 3.20, p < 0.01] when responding honestly (M = 722 ms, SD = 141 ms) than when 
responding deceptively (M= 827 ms, SD = 246 ms), and elicited a significantly greater 
proportion of accurate responses [t(15) = 3.68, p < 0.005] when responding honestly (M = 
0.95, SD = 0.03) than when responding deceptively (M = 0.90, SD = 0.07). 
In order to test the effect of lexical relationships on deceptive and honest 
responding, I conducted unpaired t-tests comparing RT data and error data of the 
plausibility group (n=9) to the violation group (n=7). I found no significant differences 
between conditions for either errors or RTs for either honest or deceptive responses.  
Post-hoc analysis 
Post-hoc evaluations revealed two confounds in stimuli: 1) Sentence length and 2) 
location of truth-value disambiguation within sentence. In order to identify patterns 
within the sentences that might lead to better item construction, I performed a principal 
components analysis on the RT of every sentence presentation. The analysis explained 
72.42% of the variance in RT within the sentences using 15 components. Overall, the 
sentences clustered into components according to truth-value, with certain notable 
exceptions. Implausible sentences consistently clustered together, but certain true and 
violation sentences were either inappropriately grouped or distributed across multiple 
factors. An examination of these sentences suggested that unusually strong syntactic 
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relationships between words influenced RT more strongly than semantic relationships, 
suggesting that certain syntactic effects may have confounded the results.   
Conclusions 
After evaluating the potential confounds, I realized that plausibility was not the 
critical factor underlying the manipulations. The semantic relationships within the words 
of the sentences was more important. I opted to redirect my research to differentiate the 
role of semantic and syntactic relationships in evaluating truth-value.  I also determined 
that controlling the sentence region in which truth-value was disambiguated was critical 
to developing a psycholinguistically controlled set of items. I decided to design items in 
which the region of disambiguation was matched across sentences.  
Lexical Violation Item Development 
Following the initial assessment of plausibility, I determined that further 
refinements were necessary with respect to sentence length, truth-value disambiguation 
location, and lexical relationships. Additionally, I wanted to create a list of items that 
would mimic deception paradigms, with the exception that the schema-cue would be 
embedded into the sentence content itself instead of the color. I determined that one 
method would be to develop a set of items that varied in accordance with a simple 
categorical judgement, such that the entire item list could be easily separated based on 
this categorical judgement. However, this manipulation should not interfere with 
sentence-evaluation, and potentially not even be noticed unless the categorical judgement 
itself was a top-down goal during sentence-evaluation. The reason for this parameter is 
that I wanted the schema-cue to be based entirely within the mind of the participant, such 
that participants given schema-based instructions and participants who are naïve to the 
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schema-manipulation could read the exact same items, but only the schema-instructed 
participants would notice the categorical distribution of the items. Such an outcome is not 
possible with the artificial nature of the color schema-cue.  
 Methods 
Participants  
Participants were 16 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina, 
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials 
Based on plausibility item development, I made critical changes to reduce the 
confounds of sentence-length and truth-value disambiguation. The items were redesigned 
to consist of only three words in the grammatical structure of Subject-Verb-Object. The 
subject-noun was isolated for the categorical manipulation, such that two lists of items 
were created based on the following categories of subject-nouns: Humans and non-
human animals (e.g. Architects, Beavers). During this process, I generated as many 
potential subject-nouns as possible in order to create potential candidates that varied in 
their phonological features (e.g. initial phoneme, word length) and semantic features (e.g. 
taxonomy: occupations/phylogeny). When one feature was determined to be the highest 
ranking feature present in the candidate list, I intentionally attempted to generate 
candidates that violated that feature in a way that introduced variety to the candidate list. 
The verb was selected such that, when integrated with the subject-noun, the subject-verb 
context would be semantically cohesive and elicit specific predictions for subsequent 
content (e.g. Architects design, Beavers gnaw).  
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The object-noun was manipulated so as to trigger truth-value disambiguation 
across four different sentence types (one true and three false). The false sentences were 
designed such that the falsity is detected at distinct processing stages (see 1-4).  
(1) True sentences: Barbers cut hair 
(2) Implausible sentences: Barbers cut wigs 
(3) Violation sentences: Barbers cut steak 
(4) Anomalous sentences: Barbers cut waves 
 
The final list was controlled to also include an equal number of humans and non-
human animals for the subject-noun. By matching all sentences in accordance to the 
preceding context, and only manipulating the object-noun, I could examine the role of 
distinct lexical-relationships across information schemas in a more controlled manner. At 
this point, the parameters regarding sentence constraint and lexical relationships are 
purely subjective and based on the principles within the psycholinguistic literature. The 
conclusions obtained from lexical-violation item development informed the type of 
objective validations necessary for the current research. The items are available in Error! 
Reference source not found..  
Implausible sentences contained words that were easily mapped onto pre-existing 
knowledge structures whereas the object-nouns in the violations sentences are not stored 
in the same knowledge structure as the preceding context.  It is known that the 
experimental context could alter participants’ internal parameters which define sentence 
evaluation (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). I 
opted to present the implausible and violation sentences to two separate groups of 
participants, but both groups were presented with true and anomalous sentences. The 
group that received the implausible sentences are referred to as the plausibility group and 
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the group that received violation sentences are referred to as the violation group; see 
Figure 2.3. Therefore, the plausibility group would read sentences containing information 
that were already associated within long term memory while the violation group would 
process information not associated within long term memory. I predicted that stronger 
memory traces of the sentences would be encoded in the plausibility group than the 
violation group. These memory traces would reduce time required to compare the probe 
and sentence and will result in shorter RTs for the plausibility group than the violation 
group. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the plausibility item development procedure. 
H1: I expected to replicate previous research revealing that honest responses are 
faster and more accurate than deceptive responses. 
Figure 2.3: Experimental Design for deployment of lexical-violation items. All 
participants encountered true sentences containing semantically related words and false 
sentence containing semantically unrelated words. One group also received false 
sentences containing semantically related words and another group received sentences 
whose syntactic constraints did not match the prior context 
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H2: The plausibility-group would elicit faster reading and response times than the 
violation-group across all sentences.   
H3: Honest responses to true sentences would be faster than all other sentence 
types, and honest responses to implausible sentences would be faster than violation and 
anomalous sentences, which would not differ from one another.  
H4: I hypothesize that, deceptive response times will be faster for violation and 
anomalous sentences than for true sentences and implausible sentences. 
Results 
Data Screening 
Two participants were removed from the study after data collection because their 
accuracy failed to exceed 80%, leaving 16 participants for data analysis, with eight 
participants in each group.  Fifteen items were removed because at least one truth-value 
condition had less than 67% accuracy, leaving 49 items for data analysis. The first five 
trials were removed to correct for familiarity with the paradigm. Data screening totaled 
26% of the data. For the RT analysis, I removed all trials with RTs of less than 300 ms, 
incorrect response on the current trial, or an incorrect response on the immediately 
preceding trial. The removal of these responses totaled 14% of the data.  
Analyses 
When analyzing RT, there was no effect of Group so it was dropped from the 
analysis, and the semantic-false and syntactic-false sentences were collapsed into a single 
factor referred to as partial-false sentences. I conducted an ANOVA on schema and truth-
value. There was a significant effect of schema [F(1, 15) = 6.98, p < 0.05] which was 
subsumed under an interaction with truth-value [F(2, 30) = 4.39, p < 0.05]. Significantly 
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faster response time to true sentences [t(15) = 7.32, p < 0.0001] was observed for honest 
responses (M = 684 ms, SE = 39 ms) than for deceptive responses (M = 862 ms, SE = 56 
ms). A similar pattern was observed for partial sentences [t(15) = 1.87, p < 0.05], with 
honest responses (M = 774 ms, SE = 44 ms) requiring less time than deceptive responses 
(M = 865.86, SE = 85.35). No significant differences were observed between honest and 
deceptive responses. The tests partially confirmed my hypotheses, such that detectability 
of deception decreased as sentences became less comprehensible.  
In order to determine why these differences of detectability were observed, I 
separated the honesty and deception conditions and conducted pairwise comparisons of 
each sentence type within the schema conditions. As seen in Figure 2.4, honest responses 
to true sentences (M = 680 ms, SE = 89 ms) were faster (all p-values < 0.005) than both 
honest responses to partial sentences (M = 771 ms, SE = 80 ms) and honest responses to 
false sentences (M = 752 ms, SE = 84 ms), while honest responses to partial sentences 
and false sentences did not differ from each-other. Contrarily, deceptive responses did not 
differ across all truth-value conditions (all p-values > 0.10).   
Figure 2.4: RT as a function of schema and truth-value 
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Although there was no significant effect of group in the omnibus ANOVA, I 
tested my hypothesis regarding the effect of group with a one-tailed independent samples 
t-test, comparing RT of the implausible group across all sentence-types to the violation 
group. The effect was only a nonsignificant trend (t(14) = 1.34, p = 0.10). Given that 
statistical learning operates on syntactic parsing processes (Fine, Jaeger, Farmer, & Qian, 
2013), I performed a follow-up analysis to test if the groups adapted to the experiment 
differently.  I conducted a generalized linear model examining the effect of trial and 
Group on the RT associated with each sentence type, which is depicted in Figure 2.5. 
Trial was nested within truth-value, with group as a between-subjects variable. The 
omnibus test was significant [2 (7) = 113.43, p < 0.001, and there was a significant main 
effect of Group [2 (1) = 35.36, p < 0.001] and a significant effect of trial × Group × 
truth-value [2 (6) = 60.69, p < 0.001]. The regression model predicted that the semantic-
group responded more quickly than the syntactic-group [β=-230 ms, SE = 9 ms, 2 (1) = 
35.36, p < 0.001]. With regards to the effect of trial on the semantic-group, the regression 
model predicted that trial reduced RT for the true sentences [β = -24 ms, SE = 1 ms, 2 (1) 
= 5.46, p < 0.02].and false sentences [β= -32 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 7.68, p < 0.01], with 
no significant effect of trial on partial sentences (P > 0.05). For the syntactic-group, the 
regression model predicted that trial reduced RT for the true sentences [β = -75 ms, SE = 
1 ms, 2 (1) = 50.34, p < 0.001], false sentences [β = -68 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 30 ms, p 
< 0.001, and partial sentences [β = -57 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 22.71, p < 0.001].  
The implausible group activated entrenched representation during their 
evaluations whereas the violation group activated novel representations during their 
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evaluations. Several dozen instances will not provide enough experience to alter 
entrenched representations but minimal experience with novel representations can elicit 
implicit learning of statistical regularities across these instances, thus facilitating 
processing of subsequent instances (Fine, Jaeger, Farmer, & Qian, 2013).  
I hypothesized that truth-value would influence honest responses, but not 
deceptive responses. To test this, I conducted a one-tailed unpaired t-test to test if the 
groups differed in their honest and deceptive responses to partial sentences. There was a 
trend in the expected direction, suggesting that the semantic group responded more 
quickly [t(15) = 1.61, p = 0.064] when making honest responses to partial sentences (M = 
710 ms, SE = 93 ms) than the syntactic-group (M = 833 ms, SE = 151 ms). Also as 
expected, deceptive responses to partial sentences did not differ between groups (p > 
0.05). A follow-up analysis was conducted on the other truth-value conditions. Because I 
lacked apriori hypotheses for group differences across these truth-value conditions, I used 
two-tailed t-tests. When responding to true sentences, both groups were similar in their 
Figure 2.5: RT across trials for participants in semantic and syntactic groups as function 
of truth-value 
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honest and deceptive responses (p > 0.05). A trend was discovered for honest responses to 
responses to anomalous sentences, such that participants in the implausible group 
responded more quickly [t(15) = 1.94, p = 0.07] when making honest responses (M = 687 
ms, SE = 93 ms) than those in the violation group (M = 822 ms, SE = 130 ms). Deceptive 
responses to anomalous sentences did not significantly differ between groups (p > 0.05).  
I hypothesized that honest responses would be more affected by lexical 
relationships than deceptive responses. This hypothesis was supported, as honest 
responses differed as a function of sentence content and experimental context, whereas 
deceptive responses were not affected by these variables.  
Post-hoc analyses 
I refrained from hypothesizing effects of schema on reading time due to the 
absence of available research. I examined reading time in a mixed ANOVA: 2 (Group: 
implausibility vs. violation) × 2 (Schema: honesty vs. deception) × 3 (truth-value: true vs. 
partial vs. anomalous). There were no significant effects of group in main effects or 
interaction, but there were main effects of schema [F(1, 14) = 12.18, p < 0.01] and an 
interaction between schema and truth-value [F(2, 28) = 4.07, p < 0.05]. The main effect 
of schema showed that honest schemas (M = 2700 ms, SE = 136 ms) elicited significantly 
faster reading times [t(1, 14) = 3.01, p < 0.01] than deceptive schemas (M = 3325 ms, SE 
= 226 ms). Two-tailed t-tests were conducted to examine truth-value across schemas. For 
honest schemas, true sentences were read (M = 2293 ms, SE = 114 ms) significantly 
faster [t(15) = 2.10, p < 0.05] than anomalous sentences (M = 2973 ms, SE = 285 ms) and 
partial sentences (M = 2835 ms, SE = 250 ms) at a trending significant level [t(1, 15) = 
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1.67, p=0.12]. For deceptive schemas, there was no effect of truth-value (all p-values > 
0.5).  The impact of deceptive schemas can be seen on mean reading time in Figure 2.6 
Conclusions 
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, truth-value only influenced reading times under 
honest schemas, with true sentences requiring less time than anomalous sentences 
whereas truth-value did not influence reading time deceptive schemas. This finding 
replicates the research showing that false sentences require more time than true sentences 
(Clark & Chase, 1972), but this finding does not generalize to deceptive schemas. Taken 
with plausibility item development, these findings support the Binding-Suppression 
Model that sentence content does not alter sentence evaluation time under a deceptive 
schema, but sentence content does alter evaluation time under an honest schema.   
Deception researchers have reported null-effects when examining difference-scores 
between deception and honesty, arguing that certain experimental manipulations can 
reduce the difficulty involved in making deceptive responses (Verschuere, Spruyt, 
Figure 2.6 Effect of truth-value and cue on reading time.  
Reading time is longer when participants are cued to respond 
deceptively 
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Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). However, the results of item development suggested that certain 
experimental manipulations may not alter difficulty of deceptive responses and instead, 
are only altering the difficulty of honest responses. Finally, the need to screen more than 
10% of the data suggests that these items need to undergo further revision.  
Revising Lexical Violation Items 
Methods 
Participants  
Participants were 17 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina, 
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials 
I revised the items from lexical violation item development that failed the 
accuracy check, resulting in 64 items, with similar conditions as before. The revised list 
is reported in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to plausibility item development. 
Hypotheses 
I expect to replicate the effect of schema on sentence-evaluation: 1) honest-
schemas would elicit faster response times to true sentences than false sentences, and 2) 
deceptive-schemas would nullify the effect of truth-value.  
Results 
I analyzed the effect of truth-value and schema on log-transformed RT with a 
linear mixed effects regression (LMER), as is recommended to maintain assumptions of 
normality (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Subjects and items were coded as random 
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effects and the accuracy on preceding trial nested within subject. Truth-value and schema 
were coded as fixed effects. The random effect of item did not explain a significant 
amount of variance to the model, so it was removed, demonstrating the high consistency 
across items. The results of the LMER is reported in Table 2.2 and the raw data is 
presented in Figure 2.7. Honest responses to true sentences were faster than honest 
responses to partial and false sentences, which did not differ from one another. However, 
deceptive responses to false sentences were faster than deceptive responses to true and 
partial sentences, which did not differ from one another. 
My hypothesis was partially supported, such that honest responses to true 
sentences were faster than sentences that were evaluated as being false (partial and 
anomalous) whereas deceptive responses did not differ between true and partial sentences 
even though the type of evaluation differed. The Binding-Suppression model predicts that 
sentences which can be rapidly evaluated can subsequently be rapidly responded to (e.g. 
Figure 2.7: The effect of truth-value and schema on mean response 
time. Results suggest different effects of truth-value across honest 
and deceptive schemas.  
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true sentences relative to partial and anomalous sentences) when one is responding 
honestly, but not when one is responding deceptively.  
Table 2.2: LMER results for effect of truth-value and instruction on RT to probe 
All evaluations 
 B CI t p 
(Intercept) 6.58 6.49 – 6.67 129.48 <.001 
Instruction (Honesty vs Deception) 0.12 0.09 – 0.14 9.001 <.001 
Honesty: Truth-value (True vs. Partial & False) 0.11 0.06 – 0.15 4.613 <.001 
Honesty: Truth-value (Partial vs False) 0.02 -0.02 – 0.07 1.015 0.31 
Deception: Truth-value (True vs. Partial & False) -0.15 -0.21 – -0.08 -4.352 <.001 
Deception: Truth-value (Partial vs False) -0.07 -0.14 – -0.00 2.01 0.045 
 
Discussion 
Deception was most easily detected for true sentences, and the reason for this 
detectability is the ease of honest responses to true sentences relative to false sentences. 
Within information schemas, different effects of truth-value were observed. Deceptive 
schemas elicited similar responses across true and implausible sentences, which were 
more delayed than anomalous sentences (true = implausible > anomalous). Contrarily, 
honest responses were faster to true sentences than to both types of false sentences, 
implausible and anomalous, which did not differ from one another (true < partial = false). 
It appears that information schema alters the influence of truth-value on subsequent 
responding, as honesty elicits faster responses to true sentences, but deception elicits 
slower responses to true sentences. Additionally, deceptive schemas are differently 
influenced by lexical relationships than honest schemas: Implausible and anomalous 
clustered under honest schemas whereas implausible and true clustered under deceptive 
schemas. The current research project explores the relationship between information 
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schema, lexical relationships, and truth-value. To improve precision and interpretability 
of this research, I decided to drop the violation condition from further experiments. 
Validation of conceptual entrenchment and linguistic expectancy  
The item development process revealed it was possible to differentiate the 
relationship of schema and semantic-relation within a truth-value. However, there were 
two potential confounds in lexical violation items. First, the item design only allowed for 
differences in semantic-relation across false sentences, with no manipulated differences 
across true sentences. The second confound was that although the sentences were 
intended to vary in truth-value within a constrained subject-verb context, this was not 
empirically validated.  
It is difficult to solve the non-orthogonality of semantic-relation and truth-value 
because semantic-relation and truth-value are not necessarily orthogonal features. The 
sheer presence of information that is semantically unrelated to a concept heavily reduces 
truth-value (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979). Only recently have psycholinguists begun 
identifying specific contextual properties that can preclude such false evaluations, such as 
including extensive linguistic qualifiers (Nieuwland & Martin, 2012) or presenting the 
otherwise unrelated information in a context that is uniquely appropriate (Filik, 2008). 
Given that these solutions involve the use of linguistically complex contexts to overrule 
semantic-relation effects, I did not consider them appropriate to examine the role of 
implicit semantic activation across information schemas. However, the role of context in 
influencing the integration difficulty of subsequent content was appropriate within the 
paradigm. Although it may be impossible to vary the degree to which a word is 
semantically related to a concept without altering truth-value, it is not impossible to vary 
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the degree to which the preceding context generates expectations of upcoming words 
without altering truth-value.  
Linguistic expectancy refers to the coherence between the current meaning 
activated by a sentence context and the adjustments that will be necessary in order to 
accommodate upcoming lexical content (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). As new words are 
encountered, readers integrate them into the preceding context, which is recurrently 
revised based on the coherence between context and word (Hale, 2003), and the degree of 
required revisions is a major source of cognitive processing (Frank, 2013). If a context 
elicits a high expectancy for a particular word, but instead that context is completed with 
a highly unexpected word, readers will generally need to revise their expectancies in 
order to fit the new word into the context. Comparatively, the highly expected word 
would demand minimal revisions, and therefore would be more easily integrated into the 
context than the unexpected word (Frank, Otten, Galli, & Vigliocco, 2015; Smith & 
Levy, 2013). Items were developed for the Lexical-Expectancy study and Embedded-Cue 
study in order to examine the role of linguistic expectancy in sentence evaluation by 
manipulating the expectancy of the object-noun within the sentences in a manner that is 
orthogonal to the truth-value of that sentence. 
Expectancy can be quantified via the cloze-probability test (Bloom & Fischler, 
1980). Participants receive a sentence fragment and then provide the word that is most 
likely to complete the sentence. The cloze-probability of a word refers to the probability 
of that word being selected to complete the sentence. Therefore, the cloze-probability of 
an individual word can be conceptualized as the expectancy of that word from the 
perspective of that specific sentence context. The process of empirically validating cloze-
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probability and truth-value was conducted using Mechanical Turk (www.MTurk.com), 
and validation proceeded in a three-stage sequence: cloze-probability validation of 
subject-verb contexts, and truth-value validation of sentences.  
Cloze-probability validation 
Subject-nouns developed in prior iterations of item development were selected 
and novel subject-nouns were generated as needed based on similar parameters (e.g. 
Archers, Chickens). I selected an object noun that I wanted the subject-verb context to 
elicit (e.g. arrows, eggs). Based on the subject-object relationship, I generated verbs that I 
believed would create a subject-verb context that was likely to elicit the object-noun, but 
would vary in the number of other object-nouns that could be elicited as well (e.g. 
Archers shoot/notch/fire/hold/prepare, Chickens lay/hatch/guard/protect/watch). All 
subject-verb contexts were presented to a minimum of 20 raters on Mechanical Turk with 
approval ratings that are greater than 95% and resided within the continental United 
States. Subject-verb contexts were presented in a random order with the instructions “fill 
in the blank with the word you think would best complete the sentence.”  
Cleaning of the cloze-probability data proceeded as follows: Misspellings were 
corrected (e.g. arrows  arrows), plural and singular nouns were counted as one (e.g. 
arrow = arrows), punctuation was removed (e.g. arrows.  arrows), and quantified 
phrases were cleaned if they consisted of less than 33% of total responses from that rater 
(e.g. lots of arrows  arrows). Semantic and/or taxonomically similar responses were not 
cleaned, and instead were counted as two distinct entries (e.g. arrowheads =/= arrows). 
Mturk users were removed and replaced if their data was deemed to be corrupted (e.g. 
quit rating process before completing), unrelated to task (e.g. 33% of data contained 
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words that no other user entered), violated task parameters (33% of data included multi-
word phrases instead of a single word) or included otherwise inappropriate language (e.g. 
profanity). Compensation was given to removed Mturk raters on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on how intentional the user appeared to be in providing unusable data.  
The goal was to develop contexts that varied in the mathematical mean of cloze-
probability, but not in the mathematical mode of cloze-probability. Therefore, cleaned 
data was organized based on the subject-noun, and within that category, the verbs were 
organized based on the object-noun with the highest cloze-probability value generated 
from that context. If a verb elicited an object-noun with greater than 50% cloze-
probability, that context was marked as a potential candidate for a high-cloze condition. 
Contexts which elicited that object-noun with a lower cloze-probability were marked as 
candidates for the low-cloze condition, so long as the highest cloze-probability response 
was shared in both contexts. For example, Archers shoot elicited arrows at 90% cloze-
probability and although Archers hold elicited arrows at 15% cloze-probability, it also 
elicited bows at 65% cloze-probability. Even though these contexts differed in their 
elicitation of arrows, it is not appropriate to argue that Archers hold is a low-cloze 
context. If the highest cloze-probability ranking was a tie between multiple words, those 
verbs were counted as viable candidates for the low-cloze condition of those object-
nouns.  
Truth-value validation 
The cloze-probability validation was intended to create two different cloze-
probability contexts for a single object-noun. The subject-verb context was combined 
with the highest cloze-probability object-noun obtained from Mturk raters in order to 
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create the true condition of the truth-value manipulation. In order to create the false 
condition, I selected object-nouns that were thematically similar to the true object-noun 
(e.g. arrows  bullets), but were designed to create a sentence that would be evaluated 
with a false truth-value.  
Sentences were presented to 10 Mechanical Turk Master Raters who specialize in 
categorization tasks, with the instructions “Rate each sentence on a scale of 1-2-3-4-5 in 
terms of how true you believe the sentence to be, with 1 being completely false, and 5 
being completely true”. In order to qualify for truth-value validation, true sentences 
required an average truth-value rating between 4-5, and false sentences required an 
average truth-value rating between 1-2. Similar rules of data screening governed the 
removal of Mturk users as during the cloze-probability validation. If a true sentence 
failed the truth-value requirements, the context was sent back to the cloze-probability 
validation stage. If a false sentence failed the truth-value requirements, then a different 
object-noun was selected and another set of ratings was collected, or the entire context 
was sent back to the cloze-probability validation stage in order to create a more effective 
context. This cycle continued until I created 40 items with four sentences that passed 
these validation requirements.  
After creating this list of 40 items that were validated on truth-value and cloze-
probability, I validated the verbs and the objects on several basic psycholinguistic 
metrics. More specifically, word frequency, age-of-acquisition, syllable length, and letter 
length of the verbs and the objects were obtained (Brysbaert & New, 2009; Kuperman, 
Stadthagen-Gonzalez, & Brysbaert, 2012) and the manipulations of cloze-probability and 
truth-value were tested for differences in these variables using a paired t-test. If a 
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condition elicited significant different results, I selected the item with the most extreme 
differences, and began the process of revising it and/or creating new items. This process 
continued until 40 items were validated in accordance to the cloze-probability and truth-
value parameters as well as the psycholinguistic controls. The average cloze-probability 
obtained for these 40 items was as follows: Low-cloze (M=45.62%, SD=14.64%), high-
cloze (M=83.87%, SD=13.95%). The truth-values for the four sentences was as follows: 
low-cloze true (M=4.49, SD=0.31), high-cloze true (M=4.66, SD=0.24), low-cloze false 
(M=1.77, SD=0.24), high-cloze false (M=1.65, SD=0.35). Cloze-probability did not have 
a significant effect on truth-value (p > 0.10, suggesting that cloze-probability related to 
the verb did not influence the truth-value related to the object-noun.  
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I conducted three studies to test the predictions of the Binding-Suppression 
Model. The first examined the role of semantic relationships on sentence-evaluation 
across honest and deceptive schemas. The second study examined the role of linguistic 
expectancy on sentence evaluation across honest and deceptive schemas. Finally, the 
third study tested if these findings generalized to an ecologically valid paradigm, where 
information schema cues were embedded in a sentence context instead of sentence color.  
Hypotheses 
In the Semantic-Relatedness, I examined the effect of information schema on 
sentence evaluation while varying semantic relationships within sentence contexts. In 
Linguistic-Expectancy, I dropped the anomalous condition from the Semantic-
Relatedness, so there were only two conditions of truth-value, and introduced a verb 
manipulation designed to alter the expectancy of object-noun in the true-condition. If 
honest and deceptive schemas are similarly informed by implicit processes, then 
linguistic expectancy should be similarly informative to sentence evaluation and response 
processes across both honest and deceptive schemas. However, if deceptive schemas do 
inhibit all implicit processes, then linguistic expectancy should only influence honest 
schemas, with no effect on deceptive schemas. In the Semantic-Relatedness and the 
linguistic expectancy as well as virtually all other deception studies involving linguistic 
materials, the truth-value and schema-cue associated with a trial are placed into different 
facets of the sentence (i.e. linguistic and perceptual features respectively). In order to test 
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if the processes involved in determining truth-value share a limited-capacity with the 
processes involved in determining schema, Embedded-Cue was conducted, in which 
truth-value and schema-cue were simultaneously embedded into the sentence.  It is 
predicted that the process of sentence evaluation and subsequent responding would 
deviate from those observed in previous studies because of the limited-capacity of 
sentence-evaluation and the additional requirements involved to maintain the schema-cue 
in working-memory instead of it being presented externally in the sentence and the probe.  
Data analysis approach 
This research implemented concepts and methods from several disciplines, all of 
which possess unique approaches to data analysis and presentation of results. I chose to 
analyze and present the data in a manner that would be meaningful to readers across the 
varying domains while still providing the most accurate presentation of the results.  
To analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in 
the following studies, I conducted a within-subjects analysis of variance (Winer, Brown, 
& Michels, 1971) Follow-up analyses were conducted as needed to evaluate significant 
interaction effects. Across all studies, the primary dependent variables included reading 
time and response time, and a primary independent variable shared across studies is the 
schema (honesty vs. deception). Specifically, for Semantic-Relatedness, another 
independent variable was truth-value (true vs. implausible vs. anomalous). Specifically, 
for Linguistic-Expectancy and Embedded-Cue, independent variables also included truth-
value (true vs. false), and cloze-probability (low vs. high).  
Effects sizes for ANOVA factors are ηp2, which is defined as the amount of 
variation in the data explained by the factor divided by the sum variation explained by the 
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factor and the variation associated with individual variation within the observations (i.e. 
Sums of SquaresBetweenGroups / Sums of SquaresBetweenGroups+ Sums of SquaresWithinGroups). 
This test reveals how much of the variation in the dependent variable are based in the 
experimental manipulation relative to the individual variability of the participants who 
elicited the dependent variable. Effect sizes for contrasts and t-tests are Cohen’s d, which 
is defined as the difference between two means divided by their pooled standard 
deviation (Meandifference / SDpooled). Based on literature recommendations, the pooled 
standard deviation was adjusted based on correlations between conditions in order to 
better determine the within-subjects detectability of effects (Lakens, 2013). Estimates of 
effect size for small, medium, and large effects are 0.01, 0.06, and 0.14 respectively for 
η2 and 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 respectively for cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), although recent 
developments in statistics have added estimates of very large and huge effects, which 
respectively refer to effect sizes of 1.2 and 2 (Sawilowsky, 2009).  
In order to explore questions relating to the individual variability of subjects’ 
reading and response time with respect to schema and truth-value, a series of linear 
mixed-effects regressions were conducted on the raw data, using the lme4 package in R 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Reading and response time was log-
transformed, as is recommended to maintain assumptions of normality (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The primary individual difference variable was CFQ score. 
Cloze-probability was not included in these models for several reasons. First, each 
experiment contained 36 participants and between 32-56 items, so in order to construct a 
model that was both appropriately powered and meaningfully interpretable, I chose to 
limit potential interactions to a three-way interaction instead of a four-way interaction. 
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Second, CFQ is related to inhibitory control of distracting/irrelevant information, 
specifically with respect to inhibiting such information from activating an inappropriate 
prepotent response (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Because truth-value must be explicitly 
considered in order to identify the appropriate response and cloze was only involved 
during the determination of truth-value, I determined that truth-value was more relevant 
to the relationship between cognitive-failures and schema than cloze-probability. 
Therefore, the individual difference analyses in Linguistic-Expectancy and Embedded-
Cue did not include cloze-probability as an independent variable. Subjects and items 
were included as a random effect. Upon fitting the maximal model for random slopes, 
slopes/intercepts were removed if they did not contribute significant variance to the 
model, using the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015).  
In order to remove variance accounted for by general practice effects or cognitive fatigue, 
the linear effect of trial was included as a non-interacting fixed effect and the effect of 
trial was included as a non-interacting random slope for subjects, thus removing variance 
related to transient state-based practice/fatigue (Baayen, Vasishth, Kliegl, & Bates, 
2017), allowing for the more precise examination of trait-based cognitive failures.  
Procedure  
Participants arrived at the lab and the experimenter familiarized them with the 
task requirements. If they agree to give verbal informed consent, they completed a pen-
and-paper version of the task. The experimenter gave instructions and feedback during 
this time. Following the pen-and-paper version, the participants completed a practice 
session on the computer. The practice session was identical to the actual experiment, 
except feedback was provided after every response in order to train the participant on the 
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task instructions; practice stimuli were similar but not identical. Participants must 
perform at 67% accuracy on at least 12 trials; participants who were unable to reach 67% 
by 30 trials did not perform the experiment due to inability to perform the task, but they 
did receive participation credit. Before the trial, the computer screen presented the 
response box instructions as a reminder. When participants were ready to begin, they 
initiated the trial with a button press 
The two-stimulus directed-deception test (DRT) was adapted for this experiment 
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005). Participants evaluated the truth-value of a 
sentence, hereafter referred to as stimulus 1 or S1, compare the evaluation with stimulus 
2 (S2: “true” or “false”), and respond honestly/deceptively regarding whether or not S2 
accurately reflects their S1 evaluation. Schema is cued by font color of S1 and S2 (red-
lie, blue-truth). These were not counterbalanced as prior research has shown that honest 
and deceptive responses are not different across the color-cues (Vendemia & Buzan, 
2003). The correct response was balanced, so that participants respond “agree” and 
“disagree” at an equal rate to all schemas and truth-values. Deceptive and honest trials 
were randomly presented so no between-trial pattern was presented, but color cues for S1 
always matched color cues of S2. The primary difference between the DRT used in prior 
studies and the DRT employed in the current study is that prior studies have generally 
Given that preparedness to deceive can influence processing time effects (Vendemia, 
Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005), I measured evaluation time and response time separately 
to differentiate processing associated with response generation from truth-value and 
preparedness to deceive. 
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Study 1:  Semantic-Relatedness 
Methods 
Participants 
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in 
this study for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials  
A subset of true, implausible, and anomalous items were selected from those that 
passed the accuracy check in the Lexical Violation Item Development studies. Additional 
items were constructed as needed in order to create a total of 64 items. I designed the 
schema-cue to be orthogonal to truth-value by presenting each item’s true condition in 
both information schemas (honesty and deception) while false conditions were 
counterbalanced across information schemas. I counterbalanced the relation between 
truth-value and schema-cue across participants as well as the exact probe word associated 
with each of these conditions, so that each combination of truth-value, schema-cue, and 
probe-word within each item was presented at an equal frequency across the entire study. 
The entire set of 64 items are available in Appendix B, but only True, Implausible, and 
Anomalous sentences were presented Semantic-Relatedness.  
Procedure 
Procedure was identical to item development procedures with one exception. 
Following completion of the DRT, participants completed the cognitive-failures 
questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982).  
Results 
Data screening 
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Items that elicited accuracy rates of less than 67% in any of the six possible 
conditions were removed from all analyses, which eliminated 7.81% of the data. All 
inaccurate responses were removed, which eliminated 5.74% of the data. I calculated 
means and standard deviation for each participant based on the screened data. Response 
times and reading times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the 
participant’s grand mean were replaced with that participant’s grand mean, a method 
designed to use an individual participant’s data to impute data of their individual outliers 
(Stevens, 2012). In total, 2.76% of the reading data was replaced and 2.59% of the 
response data was replaced.  
Sentence reading time 
I conducted a 2 X 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of schema 
(honesty vs. deception) and truth-value (true vs. implausible vs anomalous) on reading 
time. There were significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=20.38, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.368 
and truth-value, F(2,70)=17.51, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.21, but these effects were subject to an 
interaction F (2,70)=6.96, p=0.0017, ηp2 =0.09. The main effects elicited large effect sizes 
and the interaction elicited a medium effect size. Follow-up t-tests revealed that when 
participants intended to be honest, reading time of sentences was faster than they 
intended to be deceptive, with significant differences at the level of true-sentences 
(M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs. M=3687 ms, SD=1515 ms), t(35)=5.54, p<0.0001, d = 
1.14, implausible sentences (M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms vs. M=3961 ms, SD=1656 ms), 
t(35)=-3.26, p=0.0012, d=-0.58, and anomalous sentences (M=3389 ms, SD=1376 ms vs. 
M=3719 ms, SD=1617 ms), t(35)=-2.59, p=0.0068, d=-0.45. As is evident from the 
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effect sizes, true sentences elicited more detectable differences between honesty and 
deception than implausible and anomalous sentences.  Results can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
 
At the level of honest intentions, true sentences were read faster than implausible 
sentences (M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs. M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms), t(35)=5.54, 
p<0.0001, d = 1.04 as well as anomalous sentences (M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs. 
M=3389 ms, SD=1376 ms), t(35)=3.62, p=0.0004, d = 0.68, and anomalous sentences 
were read faster than implausible sentences at a trending significant level (M=3389 ms, 
SD=1376 ms vs. M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms), t(35)=3.62, p=0.0004, d = 0.29. At the 
level of deceptive-intentions, true sentences were read more quickly than implausible 
sentences (M=3687 ms, SD=1515 ms vs. M=3941 ms, SD=1656 ms), t(35)=-3.51, 
p=0.0006, d=-0.66, and anomalous sentences were also read more quickly than 
implausible sentences (M=3719 ms, SD=1617 ms vs. M=3941 ms, SD=1656 ms), 
Figure 3.1: Semantic-Relatedness reading time results. Honest-schemas vary 
in accords to truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas vary in accords to 
explicit ambiguity resolution. Honest-schemas always faster than 
deceptive=schemas 
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t(35)=-2.71, p=0.0051, d=0.50, but true sentences and anomalous sentences were read for 
a similar amount of time.  
Post-hoc analysis 
A qualitative assessment of the reading time results suggested that the implausible 
sentences were subject to a similar processing cost relative to the anomalous sentences 
(approximately 200-250 ms). If the reading time cost was similar across schemas, then 
that would suggest there was an additive factor that contributed specifically to reading 
time of implausible sentences. If so, then after accounting for this factor, processing 
requirements of false sentences appear similar under an honest schema, and processing 
times of all sentences appear similar across a deceptive schema. I conducted a post-hoc 
two-way analysis of variance, only testing the effect of schema (honesty vs. deception) 
and truth-value within the false-sentences (implausible vs. anomalous). There were 
significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=10.26, p=0.0029, ηp2 =0.23 and truth-value, 
F(2,70)=8.09, p=0.0075, ηp2 =0.19, with no significant interaction observed between 
these effects F<1. The results of the post-hoc analysis reveal similar effects of schema 
across truth-value as well as similar effects of truth-value across schema, suggesting that 
the implausible sentences were subject to an additive factor that was observed similarly 
across schemas. 
Individual differences 
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain 
unique variance in reading time at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, the results 
are not reported. 
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Probe response time 
I conducted a 2 X 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of schema 
(honesty × deception) and truth-value (true × implausible × anomalous) on response time. 
There were significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=12.11, p=0.0013, ηp2 =0.257 and 
truth-value, F(2,70)=4.28, p=0.017, ηp2 =0.057, but these main effects were subject to a 
significant interaction, F(2,70)=21.18, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.23. The effect of schema was 
large and the effect of truth-value was medium, but that the interaction effect size was 
large suggests that these effects differed heavily across conditions. Results can be seen in 
Figure 3.2. 
Follow-up t-tests revealed that the effect of schema varied as a function of truth-
value. Honest responses were faster than deceptive responses at the level of true 
sentences (M=658 ms, SD=151 ms vs. M=786 ms, SD=236 ms), t(35)=-5.84, p<0.0001, 
d=-1.24, as well as for implausible sentences (M=718 ms, SD=163 ms vs. M=779 ms, 
SD=256 ms), t(35)=-2.92, p=0.0031, d=-0.69, but there was no significant difference 
Figure 3.2: Semantic-Relatedness response time results. Honest-schemas 
vary in accords to truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas vary in accords 
to relatedness to entrenched concepts. Honest-schemas faster than 
deceptive=schemas for all sentence-types except Anomalous 
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between honest and deceptive responses to anomalous sentences t<1. The effect of truth-
value on response time differed across schema. When participants responded honestly, 
true sentences elicited faster responses than both implausible sentences (M=658 ms, 
SD=151 ms vs. M=718 ms, SD=163 ms), t(35)=5.91, p<0.0001, d=-1.01 and anomalous 
sentences (M=658 ms, SD=151 ms vs. M=727 ms, SD=172 ms), t(35)=-5.38, p<0.0001, 
d=-0.93, but honest responses were similar across implausible and anomalous false 
sentences. t<1. When participants responded deceptively, anomalous sentences elicited 
faster responses than both true sentences (M=738 ms, SD=247 ms vs. M=786 ms, 
SD=236 ms), t(35)=2.96, p=0.006, d=0.49 and implausible sentences (M=738 ms, 
SD=247 ms vs. M=779 ms, SD=256 ms), t(35)=3.27, p=0.002, d=0.55, but deceptive 
responses were similar across true and implausible sentences t<1.  
Individual differences 
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain 
unique variance in response time at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, the 
results are not reported. 
Discussion 
Honest schemas elicited faster reading times than deceptive schemas, and the 
effects of truth-value interacted with schema. Honest schemas elicited faster reading time 
to true sentences than both implausible and anomalous sentences, which were read faster 
than implausible sentences. Contrarily, deceptive-schemas, elicited similar reading times 
for true and implausible sentences, both of which were read faster than implausible 
sentences. Post-hoc analyses revealed that reading time of implausible sentences was 
subject to an additive factor relative to anomalous sentences which affected honest and 
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deceptive schemas. These analyses suggest that, after accounting for implausibility cost, 
deceptive-schemas elicited similar reading times across sentences. True sentences elicited 
larger differences between honesty and deception than both implausible and anomalous 
sentences, which elicited similar differences between honesty and deception. 
Response time patterns differed from reading time patterns. Overall, honest 
responses were faster than deceptive responses, but unlike reading times, this was not 
stable across sentences. True sentences elicited the largest differences between honesty 
and deception, followed by implausible sentences, whereas anomalous sentences elicited 
similar response times between honesty and deception. Follow-up analyses revealed that 
honest-schemas elicited faster responses to true sentences than to both implausible and 
anomalous sentences, which did not differ from one another. Deceptive-schemas elicited 
similar response times to true and implausible sentences, both of which were slower than 
response times to anomalous sentences. CFQ had no effect, suggesting that cognitive 
failures are irrelevant to these phenomena.  
Honest schemas activate explicit processes to supplement implicit processes 
As the Binding Suppression Model predicts, the largest factor of reading time was 
whether the presence/absence of semantic activation (schema: honesty vs. deception) 
would enable/suppress access to entrenched concepts in LTM (truth-value: true vs. 
implausible vs. anomalous). As predicted, honest schemas elicited the fastest reading and 
response times when semantic activation was extensively triggered (true sentences) 
relative to when evaluative processes required conscious search/retrieval (implausible / 
anomalous sentences). Following sentence-evaluation, honest-schemas encoded truth-
value effectively, as evidenced by honest response times varying in accordance to truth-
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value, with no differences across false sentences (true < implausible = anomalous).  
However, deceptive-schemas elicited a more complex response time pattern. Sentences 
that were the least related to entrenched concepts (anomalous sentences) required the 
least amount of cognitive effort (Anomalous < Implausible = True). This effect is 
intriguing, as it is a complete reversal of what is normally observed when examining 
comprehension and responding to true and false sentences.  
Deceptive schemas inhibit the role of implicit memory processes 
The Binding-Suppression Model predicted that deceptive schemas would 
proactively inhibit semantic activation, relegating all memory processes to proceed via 
conscious search/retrieval. Therefore, stimuli capable of triggering semantic activation 
would elicit distinct memory processes under honest and deceptive schemas, but stimuli 
incapable of triggering implicit semantic activation would elicit similar memory 
processes under honest and deceptive schemas. Therefore, the Binding-Suppression 
Model predicts that differences between honesty and deception should be directly related 
to a stimulus’ latent capacity to trigger implicit semantic activation, because honest 
schemas activate semantic-memory and deception will suppress it.  
My data supported this prediction in both reading and response times. True 
sentences elicited the largest behavioral differences between honesty and deception 
relative to implausible and anomalous sentences. The different effects of schema on 
anomalous sentences across reading and response time strongly suggest that binding-
suppression is initiated during sentence-evaluation, as evidenced by the stable effects of 
deception across reading time. However, binding-suppression may not be stably involved 
during response-generation. If deceptive-schemas elicited a broad binding-suppression 
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effect during response-generation, there should have been effects of deception across all 
sentences, instead of only true and implausible sentences. Therefore, detecting deception 
during response-generation may require careful control of the previously evaluated 
content in order to maximize the detectability of deception instead of ameliorate it.  
It is possible that binding-suppression is differently involved across sentence-
evaluation and response-generation, but the unbalanced design is potential confound. 
Although prior research suggests that false evaluations are qualitatively different than 
true evaluations (McCloskey & Bigler, 1980; Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981), research 
also suggests that contextual effects related to stimuli alters strategic processing (Lorch, 
1981; Reder, 1987). Furthermore such context effects can strongly alter how concepts are 
activated and responded to (Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014; Saunders & MacLeod, 
2006). Based on these findings, it is possible that the multiple false conditions increased 
ambiguity of false evaluations relative to true evaluations. I examined if semantic-relation 
effects generalize across truth-values by conducting Linguistic-Expectancy. 
If I observed unique effects of schema, then this pattern should be stable in 
Linguistic-Expectancy, such that if I presented only true and implausible sentences, 
deceptive-schemas should elicit response times to implausible sentences that replicate the 
current experiment. Contrarily, if task-parameters drove the effect, that suggests that 
deceptive-schemas are influenced by content of neighboring deceptive-schemas, even if 
they are irrelevant to the current task. Therefore, if I presented only true and implausible 
sentences, deceptive-schemas should elicit response times to implausible sentences that 
replicate the anomalous sentences reported in the current experiment.  
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Regardless of the source of the response time effects, the reading time effects 
suggest that deceptive-schemas and honest-schemas conduct sentence-evaluation very 
differently. If these effects are replicated, that would suggest that deceptive-schemas 
initiate binding-suppression during sentence-evaluation. Such a replication would be 
strong evidence that the cognitive demands of deception are behaviorally observable long 
before motoric generation of a lie response. Further deception research examining the 
unique signatures of deception during sentence-evaluation as they are distinct from 
response-generation would greatly expand the precision with which deception can be 
detected. Linguistic-Expectancy examined the generalizability of these effects by 
manipulating two factors within sentence-evaluation: sentence-integration (constructing 
the propositional message of the sentence) and truth-value disambiguation (evaluating 
whether the sentence’s propositional message accurately reflects world knowledge) 
Study 2: Linguistic expectancy   
The first study suggested that honest and deceptive schemas were similarly 
influenced by explicit processes related to truth-value ambiguity, as evidenced by the 
longer reading time of implausible sentences relative to the anomalous sentences. The 
response time results suggest that deceptive schemas were more influenced by Semantic-
Relatedness than truth-value, as evidenced by longer deceptive responses to true and 
implausible than anomalous sentences. However, the unbalanced item design precluded 
strong conclusions. In order to examine truth-value as separate from semantic-relation of 
sentence-content, I manipulated expectancy of the object-noun and the truth-value of the 
sentence. These were orthogonally manipulated via altering the verb to elicit differential 
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degrees of expectancy (i.e. cloze-probability) and by altering the object-noun to elicit 
differential evaluations of sentence truth-value. 
According to the Prepotent Inhibition Model, deceptive-schemas do not inhibit 
semantic memory, but rather motor-responses are delayed until conscious awareness can 
evaluate response-generation. If so, the facilitative effect of entrenched concepts could be 
nullified in response time. But, entrenchment should still influence sentence-evaluation 
for two reasons: 1) Sentence-evaluation requires a single button-press, so there is no 
response-ambiguity to consider and 2) entrenched concepts should be more easily 
evaluated than novel concepts. Therefore, the Prepotent-Inhibition Model predicts similar 
deceptive response times across true and false sentences, but faster reading time for true 
relative to false sentences. The model’s prediction for expectancy is uncertain 
According to the Binding-Suppression Model, deception alters the manner in 
which memory is accessed during sentence-evaluation. Deceptive-schemas suppress 
implicit semantic activation, and instead, LTM is consciously and exhaustively searched. 
This hypothesis argues that deception devalues good-enough heuristics and explicitly 
evaluates relevant information (Mayo, 2015; Mayo, Alfasi, & Schwarz, 2014; Posten & 
Mussweiler, 2013; Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Kleiman, Sher, Elster, & Mayo, 2015) 
I predict that under an honest-schema, Linguistic-Expectancy will influence 
sentence-evaluation, such that higher cloze-probability will reduce reading time, but 
following sentence-evaluation, there will be no effect of cloze-probability on response-
generation. With respect to deceptive-schemas, I hypothesize that neither linguistic 
expectancy nor truth-value will inform sentence-evaluation, and expectancy will not 
influence response-generation. However, based on Semantic-Relatedness, I hypothesize 
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that false sentences will elicit faster responses than true sentences. Therefore, if either 
expectancy or truth-value inform reading and response times in a similar manner as 
honest-schemas, my hypothesis is not supported. But if such effects are nullified or even 
reversed, the results will support and further inform the Binding-Suppression Model.  
Methods 
Participants 
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in 
this study for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials 
Forty sentences were constructed that varied in truth-value (true vs. false) and 
cloze-probability (low vs. high). I adapted materials from Semantic-Relatedness in 
accords with prior materials and validations of cloze-probability (Bloom & Fischler, 
1980; Block & Baldwin, 2010; Hahn, 2012) to suit the demands of my parameters (e.g. 
truth-value, cloze-probability, subject-categories, psycholinguistic controls, etc.).  
Stimuli consisted of 40 subject-nouns (20 animals and 20 humans) which began a 
three-word sentence with a syntactic structure of Subject-Verb-Object. For each sentence, 
Figure 3.3: Effect of Entropy on Deceptive and Honest Responding as 
Predicted by the Binding Suppression Model 
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the subject-noun was constant (e.g. Archers, Chickens), but the verb and the object were 
manipulated, creating a total of four distinct three-word sentences for each subject-noun. 
The verb was manipulated so as to construct a context where the object-noun was highly 
predictable (e.g. Archers shoot, Chickens lay) or where the object-noun was less 
expected, but both verb-contexts agreed on the most likely completion (e.g. Archers 
prepare, Chickens guard). The object was manipulated so as to construct a sentence that 
was either true (Archers shoot arrows, Chickens lay eggs) or false (Archers shoot bullets, 
Chickens lay rocks). The entire set of 40 items are presented in Appendix C. 
Procedure 
Procedure was identical to Semantic-Relatedness 
Results  
Data screening 
For reading time and response time analyses, I removed all items which elicited 
accuracy rates of less than 67% in any of the six possible conditions. This resulted in an 
elimination of 2.5% of the data. I then eliminated all inaccurate responses, which resulted 
in an elimination of 5.36% of the data. I calculated means and standard deviation for each 
participant based on the accurate items and accurate trials. Response times and reading 
times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the participant’s mean were 
replaced with their overall mean for that dependent variable. For reading times, 2.96% of 
the data was replaced and for response times, 2.54% of the data was replaced.  
Sentence reading time 
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of 
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on 
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reading time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=10.59, p=0.0025, 
η2=0.23, truth-value, F(1,35)=12.14, p=0.0013, η2=0.26, and cloze F(1,35)=9.72, 
p=0.0036, η2 =0.22. These main effects were subject to a trending interaction between 
schema and truth-value F(1,35)=3.51, p=0.069, η2 =0.09 and a significant interaction 
between schema and cloze F(1,35)=5.99, p=0.019, η2 =0.13. No other interactions were 
significant, Fs<1. The effect sizes related to schema and truth-value were large, while the 
effect sizes of cloze and all interactions were medium.  
The main effect of schema revealed that honest schemas elicited faster reading 
time than deceptive schemas (M=3361 ms, SD=1177 ms vs. M=4388 ms, SD=2277 ms). 
The main effect of truth-value revealed that true sentences were read faster than false 
sentences (M=3699 ms, SD=1426 ms vs. M=4045 ms, SD=1704 ms). The main effect of 
cloze revealed that high-cloze sentences were read faster than low-cloze sentences 
(M=3767 ms, SD=1564 ms vs. M=3974 ms, SD=1534 ms). However, the two-way 
interaction between schema and cloze as well as the trending two-way interaction 
Figure 3.4: Linguistic-Expectancy reading time results. Honest-schemas vary in 
accords to cloze-probability and truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas require 
similar reading time across all sentence-types. Honest-schemas always faster than 
deceptive-schemas 
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between schema and truth-value suggested that the effects of cloze and truth-value 
differed as a function of whether participants intended to be honest or deceptive. 
Although honest-schemas elicited reading times that varied in accordance with sentence-
content, deceptive-schemas suppress this variability (Figure 3.4). 
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted to follow up these interactions. 
Under an honest schema, reading times were significantly influenced by cloze 
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=21.28, p<0.0001, η2 =0.38 and truth-value  
F(1,35)=18.63, p=0.0001, η2 =0.35, but there was no interaction between these effects. 
The simple main effects revealed that high-cloze sentences were read faster than low-
cloze sentences (M=3187 ms, SD=1153 ms vs. M=3542 ms, SD=1244 ms) and true 
sentences were read faster than false sentences (M=3118 ms, SD=1071 ms vs. M=3611 
ms, SD=1347 ms). Contrarily, under a deceptive schema, reading time was not 
significantly influenced by cloze or truth-value, and there was no interaction between 
these effects, all Fs<1.6.  
In order to evaluate the influence of these effects on the detectability of deception, 
I conducted one-tailed t-tests to examine the difference between honesty and deception 
across all sentence types. Honest schemas elicited faster reading times than deceptive 
schemas at the level of low-cloze true sentences (M=3287 ms, SD=1080 ms vs. M=4349 
ms, SD=2040 ms), t(35)= -3.75, p=0.0003, d= -0.72, high-cloze true sentences (M=2950, 
SD=1160 ms vs. M=4255 ms, SD=2275 ms), t(35)= -3.97, p=0.0001, d= -0.76, low-cloze 
false sentences (M=3797 ms, SD=1511 ms vs. M=4461 ms, SD=2434 ms), t(35)= -1.85, 
p=0.036, d=0.33, and high-cloze false sentences (M=3425 ms, SD=1267 ms vs. M=4501 
ms, SD=2609 ms), t(35)= -2.87, p=0.0034, d=0.56. 
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Individual differences 
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain 
unique variance at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, results are not reported. 
Probe response time 
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of 
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on 
response time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=16.17, p=0.0003, 
η2 =0.32 and truth-value, F(1,35)=4.522, p=0.041, η2 =0.11. These main effects were 
subject to a significant interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=19.25, 
p<0.0001, η2 =0.35. The effect sizes for schema was large while the effect size for truth-
value was medium, but the interaction effect size was large, suggesting that the effect of 
schema and truth-value on response time varied heavily as a function of this interaction. 
Results are seen in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Linguistic-Expectancy response time results. Honest-responses are 
faster than deceptive responses only at the level of true sentences. 
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Simple main effects contrasts were conducted to examine the influence of truth-
value across schemas. These tests revealed that under an honest schema, truth-value 
significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=40.75, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.538, such that 
true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (M=661 ms, SD=166 ms vs. 
M=730 ms, SD=181 ms). However, under a deceptive schema, truth-value only elicited a 
trending significant effect on response times F(1,35)=3.09, p=0.087, η2 = 0.081, which 
suggested that false sentences elicited faster response times than true sentences (M=776 
ms, SD=242 ms vs. M=745 ms, SD=236 ms). 
To further understand the interaction, simple main effect contrasts were 
conducted to examine schema across truth-values. These tests revealed that when 
participants responded to a true sentence, schema significantly influenced response times 
F(1,35)=34.90, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.50, such that honest schemas elicited faster response 
times than deceptive schemas (M=661 ms, SD=166 ms vs. M=776 ms, SD=236 ms). 
However, when participants encountered a false sentence, there was no effect of schema 
on reading times, F<2. Taken together, these findings suggest that false sentences elicited 
no differences between honesty and deception, and that relative to their respective 
responses to false sentences, honest responses were facilitated by true sentences while 
deceptive responses appeared to encounter interference from true sentences.  
Individual differences 
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain 
unique variance at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, results are not reported. 
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Discussion 
The patterns associated with reading times were overall similar to patterns 
observed in Semantic-Relatedness. Honest schemas elicited faster reading time than 
deceptive schemas across all sentence types, but the effect of schema interacted 
separately with both truth-value and cloze-probability. Under honest-schema, both truth-
value and cloze-probability elicited the expected main effects (truth-value: true < false; 
cloze-probability: high-cloze < low-cloze). Neither of these effects were observed under 
deceptive schemas; similar reading times across all sentence types. 
Following sentence evaluation, there was an interaction between truth-value and 
schema on response times, with no effect of cloze-probability. Following a true sentence, 
honest responses were faster than deceptive responses, but there was no difference 
between honest and deceptive response times following a false sentence. The reason for 
this nonsignificant difference on false sentences is that honest responses were faster 
following true sentences than false sentences, whereas there was a trend for deceptive 
responses to true sentences to be slower than deceptive responses to false sentences. CFQ 
had no effect, suggesting that cognitive failures are irrelevant to these phenomena.  
As in Experiment 1, the Binding-Suppression Model predicts that the largest 
difference between honesty and deception should be associated with stimuli that are most 
capable of triggering implicit semantic activation. Under an honest schema, implicit 
semantic activation facilitates both initial construction of STM representations as well as 
subsequent operations on those representations, but under a deceptive schema, implicit 
processes are nullified, requiring similar amount of explicit search/retrieval regardless of 
implicit semantic relationships between stimuli.  My data supported this prediction.  
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Sentence evaluation reflects long term memory retrieval 
The Binding-Suppression Model predicts that honest schemas evaluate sentences 
based on an interdependency of implicit and explicit memory processes. Implicit 
semantic activation operates first, rapidly retrieving semantically-related information and 
explicit memory search/retrieval bolsters this representation if the semantic-activation is 
not sufficient to trigger decision thresholds. As the deficit between semantic-activation 
and decision-threshold grows, a greater amount of explicit search/retrieval is needed to 
supplement the impoverished mental representation.  Similarly, as the coherence between 
semantic activation and a relevant entrenched concept become increasingly aligned, the 
amount of required search/retrieval decreases to a comparable degree. Both truth-value 
and cloze-probability contributed distinct sources of variance in sentence-evaluation, and 
this orthogonal contribution is reflected in the reading times of honest-schemas 
Contrary to honest schemas, where sentence-evaluation is predictably informed 
by a multitude of sources, linguistic-experience and world-knowledge are irrelevant to 
deceptive-schemas. It appears that following the activation of binding-suppression, 
decision-thresholds are no longer directed in accordance to one’s lifelong experience with 
that language can mean, whether it be statistical distributions of lexical items or the LTM 
structures that organize and store world-knowledge. Although the Informational 
Exchange Schema Theory predicts that deceptive-schemas sufficiently emphasize the 
liar’s personal goals such that the liar’s world knowledge is deemed irrelevant, it is 
remarkable how apt a description that is with respect to the current results. 
After identifying that deceptive-schemas were observed to nullify the role of 
LTM structures in sentence-evaluation, I examined if this nullification was inherent to the 
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concept of a deceptive-schema or if this nullification was driven by the specific 
parameters of the deceptive-schema adopted for these particular studies. So far, the 
deceptive-schemas in this dissertation have constructed a deceptive-signal that consists of 
a perceptual color-cue. If the deceptive-signal alters LTM accessibility in accordance to 
the features of the deceptive-signal itself, then all previous deceptive-signals would not 
activate semantic-content within LTM. Colors have no relation to sentence-content, so 
even if certain LTM structures were accessible (e.g. color-hues, color-terms), the 
experiments were not designed to observe activation. The final study of this dissertation 
was designed to test if the relationship between the deceptive-signal and LTM access.  
The final study of this dissertation, known as Embedded-Cue, the deceptive-signal 
consisted of a categorical judgement, which required participants to identify the topic of 
the sentence, and if the topic matched the deceptive-signal, then it required a deceptive 
response. If binding-suppression nullifies LTM retrieval entirely, then the relation of the 
deceptive-signal to the embedded-cue should elicit similar null effects in sentence-
evaluation as the color-cue did in Linguistic Expectancy. But if the deceptive-signal 
restructures LTM access in some capacity, then the relation of the embedded-cue to the 
deceptive-signal should influence sentence-evaluation.   
Study 3: Embedded-Cue 
Experiments 1 and 2 examined how deception and honesty differ between 
responding to different levels of truth-value prepotency. However, both experiments 
involved participants knowing immediately whether they were going to be deceptive or 
honest, regardless of the meaning of the sentence. But that is not an accurate 
representation of how deception is carried out in the real-world, so the generalizability of 
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these findings to real-world deception is suspect. Language-comprehension processes 
differ based on the task-demands of the experimental context, as is evident in other, non-
deceptive experiments (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, & Nitsch, 1974; Kintsch 
& Mangalath, 2011; Barsalou & Medin, 1986). 
In order to better understand how one decides to be either deceptive or honest, I 
examined how linguistic information can be used to direct that decision. Participants 
responded to sentences similar to those in previous studies, but instead of being cued by 
font-color, participants were deceived based on whether the sentence contains a human or 
a non-human animal (or vice-versa). Therefore, participants needed to determine truth-
value while they simultaneously determine whether or not to deceive. By requiring 
participants to monitor the actual sentence content for schema-disambiguation, I can 
examine the degree to which the decision-to-deceive interacts with language-
comprehension processes in order to generate a deceptive-response. 
Methods 
Participants 
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in 
this study for extra credit in a psychology course 
Materials 
The items from Linguistic-Expectancy were reviewed and judged for inclusion in 
Embedded-Cue. In order to prevent ambiguity in the semantic categorization task, items 
that contained both humans and animals in any of their conditions were removed (e.g. 
cowboys ride horses, shepherds herd sheep). Of the items that remained, items were 
judged with respect to the accuracy criterion in Linguistic-Expectancy, so as to ensure 
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only those items that elicited sufficiently accurate responses were selected for inclusion 
in Embedded-Cue, resulting in 32 items (16 animal-subjects and 16 human-subjects). To 
ensure that the list of 32 items were similarly valid as the list of 40 items, I evaluated the 
new list of items on psycholinguistic control variables, cloze-probability, and truth-value. 
No differences were observed across truth-value and cloze-probability in psycholinguistic 
control variables. The average cloze-probability obtained for these 32 items was as 
follows: Low-cloze (M=46.09%, SD=15.04%), high-cloze (M=82.34%, SD=15.21%). 
The truth-values for the four sentences was as follows: low-cloze true (M=4.52, 
SD=0.27), high-cloze true (M=4.67, SD=0.23), low-cloze false (M=1.73, SD=0.30), high-
cloze false (M=1.65, SD=0.35). Cloze-probability did not have a significant effect on 
truth-value, suggesting that the cloze-probability manipulation of the verb did not 
influence the truth-value manipulation of the object-noun. All four conditions of the 32 
items were presented to participants, resulting in a total of 128 sentences. These items are 
available in Appendix D: 
Procedure 
Procedure was identical to Linguistic-Expectancy with the exception of how the 
participants were cued to deceive. Instead of being cued to deceive based on the color of 
the sentence, participants were instructed to determine whether the sentence conveyed 
information about a human (e.g. archers, mechanics, janitors) or a non-human animal 
(e.g. chickens, eagles, beavers), and to adopt an honest or deceptive schema based on this 
decision. The schema-category relationship was counterbalanced across participants to 
ensure honesty and deception were connected to humans and animals at an equal 
frequency. Due to the schema-cue no longer being orthogonal to the sentence content, it 
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was impossible to counterbalance the truth-value of an item with the schema-cue. 
Therefore, whereas in Semantic-Relatedness and Linguistic-Expectancy, I presented half 
of the sentences within an item as an honest schema and the other half as a deceptive 
schema, in Embedded-Cue, each individual participant responded 100% honestly or 
100% deceptively to a particular item. Counterbalancing across participants ensured that 
each sentence was associated to honesty and deception with equal frequency, but this 
equality occurred across participants instead of within.  
Data analyses 
Data analyses were similar to Semantic-Relatedness. 
Results  
Data screening 
For reading time and response time analyses, I eliminated all inaccurate 
responses, which resulted in an elimination of 5.29% of the data. I calculated means and 
standard deviation for each participant based on the accurate trials. Response times and 
reading times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the participant’s mean 
were replaced with their grand mean for that dependent variable. For response times, 
2.84% of the data were replaced and for reading times, 2.71% of the data were replaced.   
Sentence reading time 
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of 
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on 
reading time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=19.06, p<0.0001, 
η2=0.35 truth-value, F(1,35)=13.85, p=0.001, η2 =0.28, and cloze F(1,35)=7.07, p=0.011, 
η2 =0.17. There was an interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=7.82, 
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p=0.0083, η2=0.18. All other effects and interactions were insignificant, Fs<1. The effect 
sizes of schema, truth-value, cloze, and the interaction between schema and truth-value 
were all large. Reading times for sentences containing embedded schema cues varied 
according to cloze probability for both schemas, but truth-value only exerted an effect on 
honest-schemas (Figure 3.6). 
 
The main effect of schema revealed that honest schemas elicited faster reading 
time than deceptive schemas (M=3836 ms, SD=1721 ms vs. M=4508 ms, SD=2299 ms). 
The main effect of truth-value revealed that true sentences were read more quickly than 
false sentences (M=3984 ms, SD=1870 ms vs. M=4360 ms, SD=2124 ms). The main 
effect of cloze revealed that high-cloze sentences were read more quickly than low-cloze 
sentences (M=4274 ms, SD=1972 ms vs. M=4070 ms, SD=2010 ms).  
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted in order to examine the effect of 
truth-value across schemas. These tests revealed that under an honest schema, truth-value 
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=18.57, p=0.0001, η2 = 0.35, such that true 
Figure 3.6: Embedded-Cue reading time results. Honest-schemas were influenced by 
cloze-probability and truth-value but deceptive-schemas were only influenced by 
cloze-probability. Honest-schemas were consistently faster than deceptive schemas. 
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sentences were read more quickly than false sentences (M=3467 ms, SD=1518 ms vs. 
M=4206 ms, SD=2037 ms). Contrarily, under a deceptive schema, there was no effect of 
truth-value on reading times, F<1.  
To further understand the interaction, simple main effects were conducted to 
examine the effect of schema across truth-values. When participants read true sentences, 
schema significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=17.09, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.328, 
such that honesty elicited faster reading times than deception (M=3467 ms, SD=1518 ms 
vs. M=4502 ms, SD=2411 ms). When participants read false sentences, schema 
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=5.16, p=0.029, η2 = 0.13, such that 
honesty elicited faster reading times than deception (M=4206 ms, SD=2037 ms vs. 
M=4514 ms, SD=2282 ms). Therefore, the source of the interaction between schema and 
truth-value is that truth-value influenced reading times when participants intended to be 
honest, but not when they intended to be deceptive, which means that honesty and 
deception are most easily distinguished under true sentences because false sentences 
shrink the difference between honesty and deception by increasing the reading time of 
honesty without influencing reading time of deception.  
To identify how these effects influenced the detectability of deception, one-paired 
t-tests were conducted to examine the difference between honest and deceptive schemas 
across all sentence types. These tests revealed that honest schemas elicited significantly 
faster reading times than deceptive schemas at the level of low-cloze true sentences 
(M=3619 ms, SD=1560 ms vs. M=4665 ms, SD=2551 ms), t(35)= -3.14, p=0.001, d= -
0.62, high-cloze true sentences (M=3314 ms, SD=1647 ms vs. M=4446 ms, SD=2483 
ms), t(35)= -4.51, p<0.0001, d= -0.91, low-cloze false sentences (M=4294 ms, SD=2122 
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ms vs. M=4630 ms, SD=2375 ms), t(35)= -2.02, p=0.025, d=0.40, and at a trending 
significant level for high-cloze false sentences (M=4118 ms, SD=2067 ms vs. M=4492 
ms, SD=2353 ms), t(35)= -1.62, p=0.057, d=0.31. 
Individual differences 
The lmer analysis replicated the overall findings from the ANOVA analysis, such 
that true sentences were read more quickly than false sentences (β=0.18, t=7.36, 
p<0.001), honest responses were faster than deceptive responses (β=0.21, t=7.49, 
p<0.001), and as the interaction coefficient for truth-value:Schema is negative (β=-0.15, 
t=6.02, p<0.001) and the main effect coefficients are positive, the difference between 
true and false sentences is much smaller when participants intended to respond 
deceptively than when they intended to respond honestly. As expected, numeric value of 
trial reduced response times, such that as participants became more experienced with the 
paradigm, they made faster responses (β=-0.10, t=-5.60, p<0.001).  
 B CI t p 
(Intercept) 7.95 7.82 – 8.08 123.6 <.001 
Trial -0.27 -0.33 – -0.20 -7.86 <.001 
Truth-Value (true vs. false) 0.18 0.13 – 0.23 7.36 <.001 
Schema (honest vs. deception) 0.21 0.16 – 0.27 7.49 <.001 
CFQ 0.04 -0.07 – 0.15 0.66 0.517 
Truth-Value x Intention -0.15 -0.20 – -0.10 -6.02 <.001 
Truth-Value x CFQ 0.02 -0.02 – 0.05 0.84 0.392 
Schema x CFQ -0.01 -0.06 – 0.05 -0.21 0.853 
Truth-Value x Schema x CFQ -0.07 -0.12 – -0.02 -2.67 0.006 
 
There was no main effect of CFQ nor was there an interaction between CFQ and 
schema or between CFQ and truth-value, but there was a significant three-way interaction 
Table 3.1: LMER analysis of reading time in Embedded-Cue, as 
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ 
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(β=-0.07, t=-2.67, p=0.006). The lack of a main effect of CFQ or an interaction with 
other main effects reveals that CFQ did not overtly influence reading time specifically of 
any specific condition. Instead, it influenced the relationship between other conditions. 
As seen in Figure 3.7, when those with lower rate of cognitive-failures adopted a 
deceptive schema, they were more likely to read true sentences faster than false sentences 
whereas those who reported higher rates of cognitive failures were more likely to read 
false sentences faster than true sentences. 
 
Probe response time 
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of 
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on 
response time. There were main effects of schema F(1,35)=15.86, p<0.0001, η2 =0.31 and 
truth-value F(1,35)=8.12, p=0.0073, η2 =0.188. These effects were subject to an 
interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=23.32, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.40. All 
Figure 3.7: LMER analysis of reading time in Embedded-Cue 
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ. 
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other effects and interactions were insignificant, Fs<1.5. The effect sizes of schema, 
truth-value, and the interaction between schema and truth-value were all large.  
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted in order to identify the source of 
the interaction between schema and truth-value. These tests revealed that under an honest 
schema, truth-value significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=34.08, p<0.0001, 
η2=0.493, such that true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (M=706 
ms, SD=181 ms vs. M=807 ms, SD=181 ms). Under a deceptive schema, the effect of 
truth-value influenced response times at a trending significant level F(1,35)=3.69, 
p=0.063, η2 = 0.10, such that false sentences elicited faster responses than true sentences 
(M=789 ms, SD=244 ms vs. M=821 ms, SD=206 ms). Given that Linguistic-Expectancy 
suggested true sentences delayed deceptive responses, I conducted a one-tailed t-test to 
evaluate significance level in a more hypothesis-driven manner, and the test revealed that 
true sentences elicited significantly slower deceptive response times than false sentences 
t(35)=-1.81, p=0.039, d=0.47. 
To further understand the interaction, simple main effect contrasts were 
conducted to examine the effect of schema across the truth-values. These tests revealed 
that when participants responded to a true sentence, schema significantly influenced 
response times F(1,35)=57.05, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.62, such that honest responses were 
faster than deceptive responses (M=691 ms, SD=174 ms vs. M=821 ms, SD=206 ms). 
However, when responding to a false sentence, the effect of schema was not significant, 
F<1. Only true sentences were capable of eliciting significant differences between honest 
and deceptive responses, as seen in Figure 3.8 
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Overall, these effects replicated prior effects, revealing that true sentences elicited 
the largest differences between honesty and deception while false sentences did not elicit 
significant differences. Furthermore, this study replicated the effect of truth-value on 
schema in response times, such that relative to false sentences, true sentences facilitated 
honest responses while they interfered with deceptive responses.  
Individual difference analysis 
The lmer analysis replicated the overall findings from the ANOVA analysis, such 
that true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (β=0.14, t=10.27, 
p<0.001), honest responses were faster than deceptive responses (β=0.18, t=8.69, 
p<0.001), and as the interaction coefficient for truth-value:Schema (β=-0.20, t=10.38, 
p<0.001) is both negative and larger than either of the positive main effect coefficients, 
deceptive responses to false sentences are faster than deceptive responses to true 
sentences. As expected, numeric value of trial reduced response times, such that as 
participants became more experienced with the paradigm, they made faster responses 
(β=-0.10, t=-5.60, p<0.001).  
Figure 3.8: Embedded-Cue response time results. Honest-responses are 
faster than deceptive responses only at the level of true sentences.  
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  log(Response Time)   
 β CI t p 
(Intercept) 6.45 6.39 – 6.51 203.43 <.001 
Trial -0.10 -0.13 – -0.06 -5.60 <.001 
Truth-Value (true vs. false) 0.14 0.11 – 0.16 10.27 <.001 
Schema (honest vs. deception) 0.18 0.14 – 0.22 8.69 <.001 
CFQ 0.14 0.08 – 0.20 4.64 <.001 
Truth-Value x Intention -0.20 -0.24 – -0.16 -10.38 <.001 
Truth-Value x CFQ -0.02 -0.05 – 0.00 -1.74 0.081 
Schema x CFQ 0.02 -0.02 – 0.05 0.79 0.446 
Truth-Value x Schema x CFQ 0.05 0.02 – 0.09 2.83 0.005 
 
Individual differences in CFQ had a positive effect on response time, such that 
those who reported lower levels of cognitive failures elicited faster responses than those 
who reported higher levels of cognitive failures (β=-0.14, t=4.64, p<0.001). There was a 
trending interaction between truth-value and CFQ, such that there was a greater 
difference between true and false sentences at lower levels of CFQ relative to higher 
levels of CFQ (β=-0.02, t=1.74, p=0.081). However, the three-way interaction revealed 
that the effect of CFQ on truth-value differed across honest and deceptive responses 
(β=0.05, t=2.83, p=0.005).  
As depicted in Figure 3.9, honest responses to true sentences were faster than to 
false sentences, but a trending significant two-way interaction suggests that this 
difference was larger at lower rates of cognitive failures. The three-way interaction 
reveals that CFQ did not alter the difference between honest and deceptive responses at 
the level of true sentences (solid lines in Figure 3.9), but CFQ did alter the difference 
between honest and deceptive responses at the level of false sentences (dashed lines in 
Table 3.4: LMER analysis of response time in Embedded-Cue, as 
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ 
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Figure 3.9). At lower levels of CFQ, honest and deceptive responses to false sentences 
were relatively similar whereas at higher levels of CFQ, there was a marked difference. 
The cause of this difference is that CFQ delayed deceptive responses to false sentences to 
a greater extent than it did honest responses to false sentences, which had the dual effect 
of making deceptive responses to false sentences slower than honest responses to false 
sentences as well as removing the significant differences between deceptive responses to 
true and false sentences that was evident at lower levels of CFQ. In sum, CFQ moderated 
the effect of truth-value on response times, with the effect of truth-value on honest 
responses being more resilient than the effect of truth-value on deceptive responses.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: LMER analysis of response time in Embedded-Cue 
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ 
predicting reading time 
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Discussion 
Review of reading and response time results 
Honest-schemas within Embedded-Cue replicated the reading time effects 
observed in Linguistic-Expectancy: true sentences were read faster than false sentences, 
high-cloze sentences were read faster than low-cloze sentences, true sentences elicited 
faster responses than false sentences, and cloze-probability did not influence response 
time. These findings suggest that monitoring for an embedded-cue did not introduce an 
additive factor onto sentence-evaluation relative to monitoring for a perceptual-cue. 
Contrarily, deceptive-schemas in Embedded-Cue elicited different reading time patterns 
as those observed in Linguistic-Expectancy. Although the null effect of truth-value on 
reading time of deceptive-schemas was replicated across both experiments, the effect of 
cloze-probability differed across experiments. Whereas Linguistic-Expectancy only 
elicited an effect of cloze-probability for reading time under honest-schemas, the 
Embedded-Cue revealed a main effect of cloze-probability on reading time for both 
honest and deceptive-schemas In summary, when participants monitored for a color-cue, 
there was no effect of sentence-content, either through cloze-probability or truth-value 
whereas when participants monitored for an embedded-cue, cloze-probability facilitated 
reading time while truth-value replicated color-cues and elicited null effects.   
Following sentence-evaluation, response time patterns for honest and deceptive 
schemas followed a similar pattern as previously observed: Honest responses to true 
sentences were faster than honest responses to false sentences whereas deceptive 
responses showed the opposite pattern, such that deceptive responses to false sentences 
were faster than deceptive responses to true sentences. Response times were similar for 
   
90 
honesty and deception when responding to a false sentence, but honest-responses were 
significantly faster than deceptive-responses when responding to a true sentence. This 
response pattern is similar to that observed in Linguistic-Expectancy, such that the largest 
difference between honest and deceptive responses is observed in true sentences.  
Effect of cognitive-failures on reading time 
The ID analysis of response times revealed that CFQ did not drastically alter the 
results of the ANOVA conducted on reading times, but it did explain how cognitive 
failures influenced the interactive relationship between truth-value and schema. The 
individual differences analysis revealed that CFQ did not overtly predict reading time of 
any individual condition, but it did predict the relationship between reading time of true 
and false sentences when participants held a deceptive schema. As depicted in Figure 3.7, 
CFQ did not predict reading time for honest-schemas. However, under a deceptive 
schema, lower rates of cognitive failures predicted shorter reading times for true 
sentences than false sentences, but this pattern reversed as rate of cognitive-failures 
increased, such that higher rates of cognitive failures predicted shorter reading times for 
false sentences relative to true sentences.  
Effect of cognitive-failures on response time 
The main interpretations to take away from this analysis are: 1) Effects of truth-
value were predominantly observable only at lower rates of cognitive failures, and 2) 
effects of schema were far more extensive at higher rates of cognitive failures than at 
lower rates of cognitive failures. More specifically, the ANOVA analysis revealed longer 
response times for deceptive responses to true sentences than to false sentences and it 
also revealed similar response-times between honest and deceptive responses to false 
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sentences. The analysis examining rate of cognitive-failures revealed that both of these 
effects were only observed at lower rates of cognitive failures, whereas at higher rates of 
cognitive-failures, the primary effect was a larger difference between honest and 
deceptive responses. 
Binding-suppression 
The Binding-Suppression Model predicts that when one intends to deceive, all 
forms of implicit semantic activation are preemptively suppressed, but it appears that the 
accessibility of some forms of semantic information is contingent on the nature of the 
deceptive-schema. The null effect of truth-value corroborates the prediction that 
deception suppresses preferential access of entrenched concepts, suggesting that the 
embedded-cue altered the accessibility of more transient semantic associations that are 
relevant to incremental sentence evaluation processes. I argue that in Embedded-Cue, 
cloze-probability informed the suppression process of the embedded cue, thus influencing 
the time course of initiating suppression of irrelevant task-instructions.  
Expectation 
Truth-value likely influences the suppression process for the same reason as 
cloze-probability does; surprisal. But, truth-value also denotes the end of a sentence, and 
signals the reader to determine the truth-value and encode it into a STM buffer. During 
this process, any existing bindings between the STM representation and LTM are fully 
expunged in order to reduce interference between world-knowledge and effective 
deception. This expunging process may be unique to deception. If a true concept is 
retrieved, liars must update the true concept into a false one and if a false concept is 
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retrieved, liars must update the false concept into a true one. In deception, no concepts 
are entrenched. They’re all constructed in the moment for the moment. 
Dual task: Goal-monitoring vs. word-recognition 
Linguistic-Expectancy involves different cognitive requirements as Embedded-
Cue. The former involves an omnipresent perceptual cue and the latter involves a 
categorical-cue that required active maintenance and effective encoding into the STM 
buffer. Unlike Linguistic-Expectancy and the other studies, participants needed to 
conduct some form of maintenance rehearsal in order to maintain the subject-cue, while 
simultaneously, they also needed to construct and maintain sentence truth-value in order 
to appropriate evaluate and then respond to the probe. Most importantly, these operations 
must be conducted in a contingent fashion, such that schema-disambiguation (honesty or 
deception) informed the response-generation computation (i.e. agree or disagree).  In 
Embedded-Cue, the locus of goal-monitoring (i.e. deceptive-signal detection) and 
sentence-evaluation converged into shared stimulus-features, increasing the likelihood 
that the limited-capacity resources of STM would be overloaded relative to prior studies. 
Below, I describe how this disruption effect is captured in the cognitive-failures analysis.  
Cognitive failures and deception 
I argue that the null effect of cognitive-failure rate on honest-schemas replicates 
prior deception research that honesty does not require extensive goal-monitoring as well 
as prior cognitive research that cognitive-failure rate does not predict task performance 
when goal-monitoring is not necessary (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982). 
However, under deceptive-schemas, cognitive-failure rate reversed the effect of truth-
value on reading time. The Binding-Suppression Model predicts deceptive-schemas 
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suppress implicit semantic activation. Below, I describe how rate of cognitive failures is 
particularly relevant to efficacy of deceptive-schemas in the Embedded-Cue. 
First, without implicit semantic activation, all search/retrieval/maintenance 
processes require active effort and entrenchment has no facilitative effect. Second, the 
rate of cognitive failures was only relevant for Embedded-Cue, so the extra maintenance 
requirements relative to the other experiments may explain the role of cognitive-failures. 
In Embedded-Cue, sentence-evaluation required active maintenance of the schema-cue, 
meaning that participants needed to integrate S-V-O words into a holistic unit, while 
simultaneously maintaining the subject-noun and how it relates to the deceptive-signal. 
Third, lower rates of cognitive failures predict greater effectiveness in directing retrieval 
resources as well maintaining relevant content in the face of interference. In sum, the 
Embedded-Cue required participants to conduct two distinct operations in order to 
successfully perform this task, and rate of cognitive-failures likely predicted disruptions 
in effective goal-monitoring, such that the necessary information was effectively 
maintained and appropriately operated on. 
Under a deceptive-schema, lower rates of cognitive-failures predicted an 
entrenchment benefit (i.e. Reading times: true < false). Unlike true sentences, false 
sentences do not reflect world knowledge, meaning that false sentences require less 
binding-suppression of LTM than true sentences. If lower rates of cognitive-failures 
reduce likelihood of disruptions, then perhaps as cognitive-disruptions become more 
likely, sentences that require the greatest amount of cognitive-focus (deceptive-schemas 
evaluating true sentences) are most likely to experience delays following a disruption. 
The additional requirements of re-engaging binding-suppression in order to properly 
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execute a deceptive-schema will delay sentence reading time of true sentences relative to 
false sentences. 
As rate of cognitive failures increased, the rate of disruptions for explicit memory 
search/retrieval likely increased, which required restarting cognitive operations. The 
deceptive-signal would likely need to be checked again, which will delay sentence-
evaluation. Comparative, a lower rate of cognitive failures improves goal-monitoring 
efficacy. It’s important to note that cognitive-failure rate did not predict reading time of 
either true sentences or false sentences, and the ANOVA analysis revealed no differences 
between true and false sentences. The contribution of cognitive-failure rate is that it 
organized the reading time of true and false sentences, with lower rates predicting that 
true sentences will be read more quickly than false sentences, which gradually reversed 
as cognitive-failure rate increased. In summary, cognitive-failure rate did not change the 
outcome of the ANOVA results, but it did suggest that cognitive failure rate altered 
sentence evaluation strategies when participants intended to respond deceptively.  
Higher rates of cognitive failure predicted slower response times across all 
conditions, but they were especially predictive of response time differences for deceptive-
responses to false sentences. I argue that lower rates of cognitive failures were associated 
with greater efficacy at maintaining content that was relevant for task-performance (i.e. 
the embedded cue and the truth-value), as evidenced by the constant positive relationship 
between cognitive-failure rate and response time. Lower rates of cognitive-failures 
predicted faster deceptive-responses to false sentences than to true sentences because 
false sentences required less binding-suppression than true sentences. In order to 
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deceptively respond to a true sentence, LTM binding must be suppressed, and failure to 
do so necessarily increases the response-time floor carrying out a deceptive-schema.  
Automaticity vs controlled processes 
This finding coheres with the long-held theory that entrenchment increases the 
likelihood that motor plans will activate automatically following stimulus-processing 
with little explicit effort necessary (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In situations where these implicit plans must be inhibited, 
there is a limitation to the degree to which the prepotent response can be prevented from 
informing current responses (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). Entrenched 
concepts are necessarily more resistant to change than novel concepts, therefore, when 
one chooses to lie regarding an entrenched concept, the liar will need to actively suppress 
the prepotent response to a greater extent than when one chooses to lie about a novel 
concept.  
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Binding-suppression and information schema 
There are four overall patterns that are consistent across all three studies: First, 
honest schemas elicited similar reading and response patterns as would be expected by 
the psycholinguistic literature (Morris, 2006; Almor & Sloman, 2000). Second, following 
the adoption of a deceptive-schema, sentence-evaluation processes were not informed by 
LTM structures. Third, deceptive-schemas tend to encounter slightly greater interference 
when the lie-response refers to an entrenched concept instead of a novel concept. Fourth, 
honest schemas elicited consistently faster reading times than deceptive-schemas, but 
honest-responses were only consistently faster than deceptive-responses when referring 
to a true sentence.  Taken together, it appears that the single greatest predictor of 
deception detection was the degree of cognitive-load that was induced under honest-
schemas, because in comparison to honest-schemas, there was very little effect of the 
manipulations on deceptive behaviors.  
The results of this dissertation suggest that binding-suppression involves two 
stages: 1) Construct a STM buffer that is quarantined from LTM concepts and 2) ensure 
that quarantine is maintained until such time as the buffer is no longer necessary for the 
task at hand. Given that binding-suppression relies on a mechanism capable of 
maintaining STM representations that contradict world-knowledge, it is necessary to 
propose the nature a storage unit. As of now, the theorized cognitive component most 
relevant to this component is the episodic buffer from Baddeley & Hitch’s Model of 
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Working Memory (Baddeley, 2000). By encoding into this transient storage unit, STM 
can be quarantined away the LTM-concepts from which its representation came from.  
Interference theory: Entrenchment facilitates honesty and impairs deception  
Since its inception, the memory literature has reliably observed that introducing 
novel information into entrenched memory structures creates interference because that 
newly revised memory structure now contains incongruent associations (McGeoch & 
Irion, 1952; Anderson, 2003). I propose that interference theory cogently explains why 
entrenched-concepts facilitated honest responses but interfered with deceptive-responses.  
Deeply entrenched concepts are sufficiently rooted into LTM structures that other 
concepts within LTM are contingent on their validity (Shipley, 1993). If the concept 
Chickens lay eggs were evaluated as false, and then encoded back into LTM, that could 
have far-reaching effects, undermining concepts related to chickens, birds, and eggs. 
Comparatively, Chickens guard rocks has little relation to LTM knowledge structures. 
Entrenched concepts require comparatively more binding-suppression, which is 
necessary to prevent: 1) LTM from redirecting the deceptive-schema back to the truth 
and 2) ensuring that LTM remains stable and coherent after deception is successfully 
executed. In summary, it appears that the latent capacity for a stimulus to trigger 
spreading-activation may be directly related to the degree of binding-suppression 
required to deceptively respond to it.  
Binding-suppression is necessary to quarantine STM representations from the 
LTM structures. If binding-suppression were prematurely released, then semantic-
memory could seep into the deceptive-schema, introducing interference into the STM 
representations and/or the organizational structure of semantic-memory. Based on the 
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attentional literature, the longer one is required to maintain a rigid mental state, the more 
likely it is for attention to wax and wane, and cause the mental set to briefly fail. If 
binding-suppression fails, then semantic memory may interact and thusly interfere with 
the deceptive-schema. In the next section, I discuss how cognitive-failure rate speaks to 
this transient effort to maintain binding-suppression.  
Individual differences 
The CFQ is not linked to standard capacity measures of cognitive functioning, 
such as visual/verbal working memory, conceptual short term memory, delayed recall 
(Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), response-conflict via Stroop, focused 
attention via dichotic listening, or visual search via the embedded figures task (Martin, 
1983), nor has it been linked to intrusions from either misinformation (Jaschinski & 
Wentura, 2002) or salient distractors (Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008).  
The CFQ has been linked to response-distractor inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004), as evidenced by correlations between the CFQ and tasks which require active 
suppression of distracting/irrelevant information from activating response processes 
(Groome & Grant, 2005; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). One reason for the null relationships 
between the CFQ and inhibitory tasks such as the Stroop is that the CFQ has been linked 
to cognitive dissociation, which reflects one’s predisposition to self-disrupt ongoing 
cognitive processes with no external cause (Bruce, Ray, & Carlson, 2007).  
Possible explanations for this self-disruption is that CFQ may reflect one’s 
capacity to reliably monitor their behavior, ensuring their actions are directed towards 
accomplishing top-down goals (Garavan, Hester, Murphy, Fassbender, & Kelly, 2006), as 
evidenced by the positive correlation between CFQ score and involuntary intrusion of 
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thoughts that are unrelated to the task at hand (Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007; Smallwood, et 
al., 2004). In order to effectively deceive, binding-suppression must be restored and the 
conflicting information removed.  
Regardless of the cause, it is evident that the CFQ measures one’s capacity to 
maintain a consistent link between cognitive processes and the external environment so 
as to elicit behaviors that successfully accomplish top-down goals (Bridger, Johnsen, & 
Brasher, 2013). Due to the unpredictable nature of when/why cognitive failures manifest 
themselves and disrupt ongoing cognitive processes, the CFQ predicts performance 
specifically when participants need to maintain an active control over their thoughts over 
a period of time (Steinborn, Langner, Flehmig, & Huestegge, 2016). Tasks such as the 
Stroop and the Hayling examine response-inhibition in a more immediate fashion, with 
minimal requirements to maintain suppression over a period of time.  
Sentence-evaluation involves the incremental integration of each word into the 
preceding context. This incrementally constructed proposition is encoded into STM and 
evaluated against organized concepts within LTM. Under an honest-schema, the distance 
between the proposition and LTM concepts predicts the processing requirements of 
sentence-evaluation, as evidenced by the effect of linguistic certainty and conceptual 
entrenchment. Deceptive-schemas are not influenced by these factors. 
Successful inhibition of semantic memory during deception likely elicits two vital 
effects: 1) Prevents knowledge structures from interfering with the construction and 
deployment of a deceptive response and 2) protects the integrity of knowledge structures 
by quarantining the lie from semantic memory, ensuring that it is not encoded during 
reconsolidation. By inhibiting semantic association, the lie can be created and 
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quarantined to this unique context without fear of it generalizing to general knowledge. 
Failure to engage this inhibitory control may be relevant to the phenomenon known as 
malingering, which refers to the decision to engage in a long-term deception, such as a 
medical diagnosis, for some form of social benefit (Merckelbach & Merten, 2012).  
Over time, the content of one’s deceptions can infect autobiographical memory, 
as individuals begin to alter their memories in order to accommodate the content of the 
lies (Festinger, 1962). Neuroimaging evidence supports this argument as brain activity of 
malingering patients reflects a population distribution, which ranges from those who 
resemble deceptive participants to those who resemble honest participants (Langleben, 
Dattilio, & Guthei, 2006). Perhaps binding-suppression requires active intentionality not 
only to ensure effective deception, but also to protect the integrity of the liar’s personal 
memories intact. Over, binding-suppression may erode, and the deceptive-schema may 
become erroneously encoded into LTM. If so, then the Binding-Suppression Model 
predicts that the degree to which a deceptive response can be consciously constructed on 
the basis of top-down goals correlates with the subsequent integrity of knowledge 
structures after successful deployment of the lie.  
Alternative explanations 
It is possible that maintaining a deceptive schema necessarily shifts attentional 
processes into an exhaustive search instead of a self-terminating search. It has long been 
suggested that lexical access is exhaustive when the stimulus corresponds to a 
nonexistent concept (Forster & Bednall, 1976). Given that false sentences elicited similar 
response times across honesty and deception, and deceptive responses were much more 
similar across true and false sentences than those sentences types were in honesty, it is 
   
101 
possible that when one intends to be deceptive, they necessarily elicit exhaustive searches 
regardless of whether they activated a meaning at an earlier point. If so, then the fact that 
deceptive responses were more delayed to true sentences than honest responses could be 
due to a difference in search termination criteria instead of anything to do with the 
suppression of LTM associations.  
Another possibility that deceptive schemas are particularly taxing on the 
phonological loop. Prior research has showed that phonological suppression impairs task-
performance that require goal-monitoring, regardless of the cognitive-load induced by 
task-demands (Saeki & Saito, 2004). Phonological resources are necessary in order to 
ensure all behaviors are goal-driven instead of stimulus-driven (Miyake, Emerson, 
Padilla, & Ahn, 2004) especially when that goal requires preventing habitual responding 
from influencing response selection (Saeki, Baddeley, Hitch, & Saito, 2013). If 
deceptive-schemas deplete phonological resources, then these findings can be explained 
by limited-capacity theories of STM. With phonological resources being directed to 
organize all behavior in a goal-oriented fashion, the role of stimulus-based effects will be 
minimized, and overall effort required to read and respond will also be increased.  
Study limitations 
Clinical implications 
The current results suggest that honesty and deception differ in terms of what 
constitutes “cognitive-load.” Therefore, I argue that instead of trying to induce cognitive-
load on liars, clinicians may be more successful in detecting deception may by 
minimizing cognitive-load as much as possible. Such a procedure will then allow honest-
schemas to proceed unencumbered whereas deceptive-schemas will still exhibit the 
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cognitive-load brought on by deception. Because we know that deception is already 
difficult, introducing any cognitive-load onto honest-schemas may be counter-productive. 
If the field decides examine cognitive-effort as being an indicator of deception, then the 
environment should be controlled as much as possible in order to minimize the possibility 
that honesty will exhibit signs of cognitive-load. Then, when a suspect indicated signs of 
cognitive-load, the protocol will have heavily reduced the possibility that an honest-
schema is eliciting those signatures. Therefore, I argue that minimizing cognitive-load 
will enhance the differences in cognitive-effort between honesty and deception. 
Future directions  
Specifics of binding-suppression 
I’ve proposed that human cognition can construct a STM-buffer capable of 
maintaining representations which contradict LTM concepts. The buffer is quarantined 
from the LTM concepts from which the representations were based. Currently, the nature 
of this quarantine is unspecified, as the current data provide no predictions regarding how 
the cognitive system restores LTM bindings upon executing a deceptive-response. I 
propose a follow-up study that replicates the majority of methods from Embedded-Cue, 
but introduces a task-switching component: schema x subject x truth-value.  
Schema-Switch:  Honesty-Repeat Honesty-Switch 
Deception-Repeat Deception-Switch 
Knowledge:switch Subject-Repeat Subject-Switch 
   Truth-value- Repeat Truth-value- Switch 
 
After having suppressed bindings related to Chickens, how accessible are those bindings 
if participants had to immediately deceive about them again vs. if they had to 
immediately respond honestly to those same bindings. If deceptive-schemas literally do 
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suppress specifically the LTM concepts necessary for the deceptive-response, then there 
should be a particularly large switch-cost when participants are required to switch from 
deception to honesty on the same concept. Contrarily, there will be probably be a benefit 
when participants switch honesty to deception with the same category, as it is already 
within STM, thus binding-suppression can be more rapidly initiated.   
Relation of deception and working memory models 
In order to determine if deception shares capacity-limited resources with 
phonological representations, I plan to manipulate the phonological demands of the 
sentences (e.g. 3 words vs. 5 words | true vs. false sentences). By separating the subject, 
which signals response-intention, from the object, which signals truth-value following 
integration with preceding context, I can examine the role of phonological demands on 
the act of monitoring for deception vs. the act of deception itself.  
If phonological demands elicit a main effect on reading time, that suggests that 
goal-monitoring for deception is dependent phonological resources, regardless of whether 
or not one eventually decides to deceive. If phonological demands interact with intention, 
such that deception incurs a larger cost than honesty during high phonological demands, 
then that suggests the preparation to deceive requires phonological resources. Finally, if 
truth-value interacts with these effects, that will inform how deceptive schemas alter the 
process of chunking distinct phonological representations into a single meaningful chunk.  
Self-paced reading task 
In order to better understand the incremental process of binding-suppression, I 
propose that Embedded-Cue study be replicated with a self-paced reading task. If 
binding-suppression nullifies LTM from the outset, there should be a diminished effect of 
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cloze-probability both at the verb and at the noun. However, if binding is only suppressed 
at final integration processes, then cloze-probability should influence verb reading times.  
Effort required to maintain episodic buffer 
In order to determine if deception requires an active suppression of LTM bindings 
from the STM truth-value, I plan to examine if the duration of the delay between sentence 
and probe will influence response time. If an active suppression is required in order to 
deceive, then lengthening the delay should increase the effort required to maintain 
binding-suppression of the STM buffer, lengthening response times and increasing errors.  
Conclusion 
The present studies reveal that within the confines of a deception paradigm, the 
manifestations of honest behavior replicate basic cognitive psychology findings relating 
to incremental adjustments of linguistic certainty during sentence processing (Frank, 
2013) as well as the role of entrenched concepts in declarative knowledge during 
sentence binding and explicit truth-value evaluation (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). 
Linguistic certainty reduces the amount of processing time required to understand and 
evaluate a sentence, but following the binding of a sentence into a holistic unit of 
meaning, the semantic representation of a sentence is more relevant than the specific 
lexical forms that comprise it (Christiansen & Chater, 2016). However, the adoption of a 
deceptive-schema appears to alter basic cognitive processes relating to evaluating 
sentences and generating responses in relation to those sentences. Deception appears to 
suppress implicit semantic activation during these processes, but the effort of this 
suppression is taxing. In order to suppress semantic memory, and construct STM 
representation that contradict world-knowledge, the effort involved in deploying a 
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deceptive response is related to the strength of the contradicted memory. In summary, I 
argue that deception is a cognitive process just like any other, and therefore, it is prone to 
behavioral conflict just like any other process (e.g. interference, decay), but it’s possible 
that the rules which govern the manifestation of behavioral conflict in honesty may not be 
generalizable to behavioral conflict in deception. 
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Subject Category: Humans 
Item Subject Verb   True Semantic Syntactic False 
1 Archers shoot   arrows bullets drugs sandals 
2 Architects design   houses closets weddings suits 
3 Astronomers study   stars law soccer smiles 
4 Attorneys meet   clients prisoners dates poems 
5 Babysitters watch   toddlers parents sunsets music 
6 Barbers cut   hair wigs steak waves 
7 Bartenders mix   drinks cakes speeches lakes 
8 Brokers pick   stocks songs apples phantoms 
9 Caterers prepare   meals bacteria lessons baths 
10 Chefs cook   pancakes pears wax storms 
11 Coaches train   athletes soldiers computers gates 
12 Cowboys ride   horses camels bicycles peacocks 
13 Dancers perform   waltzes concerts karate journals 
14 Doctors diagnose   patients strangers engines meadows 
15 Farmers raise   cows pests taxes roads 
16 Gardeners plant   flowers weeds flags clothes 
17 Hunters track   ducks termites expenses paper 
18 Janitors clean   rooms shoes consciences tape 
19 Knights rescue   princesses villains firefighters aluminum 
20 Lifeguards protect   kids sharks cattle books 
21 Mechanics fix   cars toys marriages daylight 
22 Novelists write   books music laws beads 
23 Parents lecture   children pilots audiences vehicles 
24 Plumbers repair   faucets trucks skin spoons 
25 Postmen deliver   mail food babies oil 
26 Runners carry   liquid tea poison keys 
27 Sailors chart   courses highways sales stoves 
28 Shepherds herd   sheep bison riots motorcycles 
29 Students attend   lectures funerals physicians wicker 
30 Teachers instruct   students principals monkeys cameras 
31 Therapists treat   depression measles movies darkness 
APPENDIX A: LINGUISTIC-EXPECTANCY STIMULI 
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32 Vampires drink   blood soda bottles coral 
   
  
 
 
          
Subject Category: Animals 
Item Subject Verb   True Semantic Syntactic False 
1 Apes peel   bananas elephants paste lakes 
2 Bears catch   fish streams colds dye 
3 Beavers gnaw   wood sand pencils shrimp 
4 Buffalo roam  plains deserts hallways wires 
5 Cats chase   mice cages deserts moss 
6 Cows produce   milk honey art rays 
7 Crows collect   string pollen stamps cement 
8 Dogs chew   bones glasses gum lemonade 
9 Ducks fly   south underwater packages underground 
10 Eagles build   nests dams bridges carpets 
11 Elephants crave   peanuts cats gadgets pictures 
12 Frogs eat   insects toads dust cliffs 
13 Giraffes nibble   leaves lions ears plaster 
14 Goats scale   mountains fences buildings sleeves 
15 Horses pull   wagons tractors all-nighters clouds 
16 Jaguars stalk   prey butterflies actors radios 
17 Koalas climb   trees dunes ladders staplers 
18 Lambs grow   wool antlers wheat walls 
19 Lions maul  villagers spears furniture alarms 
20 Mules munch   hay saddles losses helmets 
21 Nightingales serenade   mates hatchlings crowds banks 
22 Oxen plow   fields grass snow eagles 
23 Porcupines shoot   quills fur guns watches 
24 Pythons strangle   rodents whales economies socks 
25 Raccoons steal   trash pinecones cable haircuts 
26 Rats spread   germs toys rumors reefs 
27 Squids squirt   ink water jelly sneakers 
28 Squirrels hoard   nuts marbles profits beds 
29 Tigers prowl   grasslands swamps nightclubs blueprints 
30 Turkeys lay   eggs straw bricks clocks 
31 Weasels dig   holes ditches basements wind 
32 Whales breathe   air bubbles words scales 
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Subject Category: Humans 
Item Subject Verb   TRUE Semantic Syntactic FALSE 
1 Archers shoot   arrows bullets drugs sandals 
2 Architects design   houses rulers weddings suits 
3 Astronomers study   stars law soccer smiles 
4 Attorneys meet   clients bailiffs dates poems 
5 Babysitters watch   toddlers parents sunsets music 
6 Barbers cut   hair wigs steak waves 
7 Bartenders mix   drinks cakes speeches lakes 
8 Brokers pick   stocks movies apples phantoms 
9 Caterers prepare   meals bacteria lessons baths 
10 Chefs cook   pancakes pears wax storms 
11 Coaches guide   athletes soldiers boats gates 
12 Cowboys ride   horses camels bicycles peacocks 
13 Dancers perform   waltzes plays karate journals 
14 Doctors diagnose   patients thermometers engines meadows 
15 Farmers raise   cows pests taxes roads 
16 Gardeners plant   flowers weeds flags clothes 
17 Hunters track   ducks termites expenses paper 
18 Janitors clean   rooms shoes consciences tape 
19 Knights rescue   princesses villains firefighters aluminum 
20 Lifeguards protect   kids sharks cattle books 
21 Mechanics fix   cars toys marriages daylight 
22 Novelists write   books music laws beads 
23 Parents lecture   children pilots audiences vehicles 
24 Plumbers repair   faucets trucks skin spoons 
25 Postmen deliver   mail food babies oil 
26 Runners wear   shoes helmets perfume boxes 
27 Sailors chart   voyages highways stocks stoves 
28 Shepherds herd   sheep bison riots motorcycles 
29 Geographers map   land compasses equations paint 
30 Teachers instruct   students principals monkeys cameras 
31 Therapists treat   depression couches dramas darkness 
APPENDIX B: REVISED STIMULI FOR SEMANTIC-RELATEDNESS 
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32 Vampires drink   blood soda bottles coral 
  
 
 
             
Subject Category: Animals 
Item Subject Verb   True Semantic Syntactic FALSE 
1 Apes peel   bananas elephants paste lakes 
2 Bears catch   fish streams colds dye 
3 Beavers gnaw   wood sand pencils shrimp 
4 Buffalo roam 
 
plains deserts hallways wires 
5 Cats chase   mice cages deserts moss 
6 Cows produce   milk honey art rays 
7 Crows collect   twigs pollen stamps cement 
8 Dogs chew   bones glasses gum lemonade 
9 Ducks fly   south underwater packages underground 
10 Eagles build   nests dams bridges carpets 
11 Elephants crave   peanuts cats gadgets pictures 
12 Frogs eat   insects toads dust cliffs 
13 Giraffes nibble   leaves lions ears plaster 
14 Goats scale   mountains fences buildings sleeves 
15 Horses pull   wagons tractors all-nighters clouds 
16 Jaguars stalk   prey butterflies actors radios 
17 Koalas climb   trees dunes ladders staplers 
18 Lambs grow   wool antlers wheat walls 
19 Lions maul 
 
zebras spears furniture alarms 
20 Mules munch   hay boots losses helmets 
21 Nightingales serenade   mates branches crowds banks 
22 Oxen plow   fields trees snow eagles 
23 Porcupines shoot   quills fur guns watches 
24 Pythons strangle   rodents whales economies socks 
25 Raccoons steal   trash pinecones cable haircuts 
26 Rats spread   germs toys rumors reefs 
27 Squids squirt   ink water jelly sneakers 
28 Squirrels hoard   nuts marbles profits beds 
29 Tigers prowl   grasslands swamps nightclubs blueprints 
30 Turkeys lay   eggs straw bricks clocks 
31 Weasels dig   holes birds basements wind 
32 Whales breathe   air bubbles words scales 
 
  
   
127 
Item Subject Verb Object  
  Cloze-Probability Truth-Value  
  Animals low high True False 
1 Apes grasp peel bananas peanuts 
2 Beavers gnaw chomp wood sand 
3 Bees visit pollinate flowers graves 
4 Birds travel migrate south underwater 
5 Cats scare chase mice bears 
6 Chickens guard lay eggs rocks 
7 Cows contain produce milk honey 
8 Dogs retrieve bury bones chairs 
9 Dolphins inhale breathe air dust 
10 Eagles repair build nests dams 
11 Frogs follow catch flies birds 
12 Monkeys ascend climb trees dirt 
13 Oxen work plow fields caves 
14 Possums appear play dead clean 
15 Raccoons disturb scavenge garbage gasoline 
16 Rats cause spread disease medicine 
17 Seals seek eat fish mice 
18 Snakes watch eat mice whales 
19 Ticks need suck blood bones 
20 Tigers prowl rule jungles deserts 
      
Item Subject Verb Object 
  Cloze-Probability Truth-Value 
 Humans low high True False 
1 Archers prepare shoot arrows bullets 
2 Architects sketch design buildings mountains 
3 Astronomers record study stars law 
4 Babies need drink milk soda 
5 Bakers mix roll dough mud 
6 Brokers buy pick stocks movies 
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7 Butchers utilize sharpen knives arrows 
8 Cowboys own ride horses elephants 
9 Farmers raise milk cows bugs 
10 Gardeners fertilize water plants snow 
11 Janitors clean mop floors lawns 
12 Lifeguards safeguard protect swimmers sharks 
13 Mailmen manage deliver mail houses 
14 Mechanics repair fix cars gloves 
15 Novelists create write books music 
16 Parents carry discipline children doctors 
17 Pirates own bury treasure aircraft 
18 Sailors operate steer ships planes 
19 Shepherds buy herd sheep wolves 
20 Tailors alter sew clothes pictures 
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Item Subject Verb Object  
  Cloze-Probability Truth-Value  
 Animals low high True False 
1 Beavers gnaw chomp wood sand 
2 Bees visit pollinate flowers graves 
3 Birds travel migrate south underwater 
4 Cats scare chase mice bears 
5 Chickens guard lay eggs rocks 
6 Cows contain produce milk honey 
7 Dogs retrieve bury bones chairs 
8 Eagles repair build nests dams 
9 Frogs follow catch flies birds 
10 Monkeys ascend climb trees dirt 
11 Raccoons disturb scavenge garbage gasoline 
12 Rats cause spread disease medicine 
13 Seals seek eat fish mice 
14 Snakes watch eat mice whales 
15 Ticks need suck blood bones 
16 Tigers prowl rule jungles deserts 
      
Item Subject Verb Object 
  Cloze-Probability Truth-Value 
 Humans low high True False 
1 Archers prepare shoot arrows bullets 
2 Architects sketch design buildings mountains 
3 Astronomers record study stars law 
4 Babies need drink milk soda 
5 Bakers mix roll dough mud 
6 Brokers buy pick stocks movies 
7 Butchers utilize sharpen knives arrows 
8 Gardeners fertilize water plants snow 
9 Janitors clean mop floors lawns 
10 Mailmen manage deliver mail houses 
APPENDIX D: STIMULI FOR EMBEDDED-CUE 
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11 Mechanics repair fix cars gloves 
12 Novelists create write books music 
13 Parents carry discipline children doctors 
14 Pirates own bury treasure aircraft 
15 Sailors operate steer ships planes 
16 Tailors alter sew clothes pictures 
 
